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03/11

CHAPTER 7 – Monmouth Vicinage, Monmouth County Superior Court, N.J., Lawrence M. Lawson, A.J.S.C., Freehold, N.J.

6:50 PM by . Filed under: CHAPTER 7 - THE COURTS
LAST UPDATED: May 27, 2014
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UPDATES: PLEASE NOTE THAT THE BODY OF INFORMATION IS DOWN BELOW THE UPDATES.

May 27, 2014:  We will begin writing the book now, since law enforcement, including the FBI, refuse to investigate New Jersey public servant corruption regarding this suspicious death case.

January 5, 2014:  We are still waiting to hear from the Newark FBI Field Office.  Brian J. Nadeau, Unit Chief of the Public Corruption Unit in the Washington, DC, Field Office, forwarded our communication, including about 100 pages of evidence, to the FBI Field Office in Newark.

September 5, 2013:  The FBI office in Newark has been contacted regarding this corruption.  We are pending a response from them at this time.

Aug 4, 2011:  Since Judge Lawson (Monmouth Vicinage) refused, despite instructions from Middlesex Vicinage, to allow submission of evidence during the probable cause hearing (stating on the record that it was a “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing), we submitted a single complaint against Dr. DiCarlo for falsifying government records.  Ignoring relevant evidence submitted with the citizens criminal complaint, Judge Lawson knowingly and purposely used false affirmations made by Dr. DiCarlo to support his intended outcome, which was to exonerate DiCarlo.  Judge Lawson disregarded material evidence, including an admission by Dr. DiCarlo that he violated the law by not conducting an autopsy, and thus falsified Joyce’s certificate of death.  Judge Lawson concluded that we had no standing to file an appeal in this matter.  This continues to show his ignorance of the law and his intent to protect Raymond J. Sauter, and all the others, from being investigated for circumstances surrounding Joyce’s suspicious death, and the subsequent cover-up.  At the least, this shows a Pattern of Official Misconduct on Judge Lawson’s part.

 

This chapter is about corruption in the N.J. Courts.  It is also about a biased and prejudiced Probable Cause Hearing held on January 11, 2011, in Monmouth County (Freehold) Vicinage, by the Hon Lawrence M. Lawson, A.J.S.C. (Assignment Judge Superior Court).  Governor Chris Christie is aware of this case.

According to the Rules of the Court, and in concert with a statement from the Court, this Probable Cause Hearing was open to the public.

There are three parts to this chapter.  Part I is the Official Court Transcript available to the public.  Part II is the Official Opinion of the Court (Judge Lawrence M. Lawson), also available to the public.  Part III, immediately below, is Strouse’s response to the Court’s biased and prejudiced Opinion.

 PART I

 Click on the following link to review the Official Transcript of the Probable Cause Hearing - Court Transcript 01.11.2011.

 PART II

 Click on the following link to review the Official Transcript of the Courts Opinion – Court Opinion.

 PART III

 The following narrative is Strouse’s Official Response to the Courts Opinion.  The “attachments” mentioned in the narrative are not included herein.

Strouse Response to the

Opinion of

Judge Lawrence M. Lawson, A.J.S.C.,

Dated January 20, 2011

 

This hearing comes to Monmouth County Superior Court following a Change of Venue hearing in Middlesex County Superior Court on October 5, 2010. This Court has once again changed the “name” from State v Raymond J. Sauter et al to State v Frederick J. DiCarlo, M.D. et al.  For whatever reason, it appears the Courts do not want the name of Raymond J. Sauter prominent on these documents.  This is a murder case charging Sauter with the suspicious death of his wife, who was my sister, and the subsequent cover-up by numerous public servants from Middlesex County and the Attorney General’s Office.  This Court refused to permit Strouse to enter any evidence into the record and found no probable cause for all 61 criminal complaints “pursuant to R. 3:3-2”, a Rule of the Court that was deleted effective January 1, 1995. 

 

Comments to Judge Lawson’s Cover Letter:

Judge Lawson has the matter incorrectly stated, that is to say, he neglects to state it at all (attachment 1).  In the audio CD-R (two disks), Judge Lawson refers to the case as “The State of New Jersey v. Frederick J. DiCarlo”, which is likewise incorrect.  Based on previous Middlesex County Court’s writings, the case should be stated, for consistency’s sake, “The State of New Jersey v. Raymond J. Sauter et al” (attachment 2).  Previously, Judge Lawson had referred to this case as the “State of New Jersey v. Strouse (attachment 3), also in error, as he acknowledged on January 11, 2011.  This continues the well-established pattern of frivolous conduct and harassment on the part of the Courts against Strouse.

Judge Lawson incorrectly refers to an action that did not occur on January 11, 2011, at 10:00 a.m., in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County Court House, to wit, “Re:  Probable Cause Hearings”  (attachment 1).  Judge Lawson refused to accept evidence brought specifically for the Court’s use and refused to permit William H. Strouse, the Complainant (or Carolyn Ausley, sibling), to use the evidence to present and support his Citizen Complaints for Probable Cause (attachment 4).  Strouse was previously informed by other Courts that he would be expected to present his evidence at the hearing, and indeed, other courts clearly stated that all necessary information was included with the Complaints.    In fact, Strouse was told, regarding providing evidence, “In response to your letter dated December 16, 2009, as explained in our phone conversation the face of the complaint has limited space so you are asked to condense your statement as much as possible.  If you feel you need to attach an additional sheet for the Judge to review you may do that but please be advised it is impossible to include all of that statement of (sic) the face of the original complaint.”  Nearly two hours were spent on hearing “xxx-313) (charge against Frederick J. DiCarlo?), though the topic was mostly about Raymond J. Sauter.  Through the relationship among all 61 complaints, a number of other defendants were discussed, but none of their specific complaints were addressed.  Sixty other complaints were not heard before Judge Lawson ended what he referred to as the “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing.” 

Judge Lawson sent a copy of the Court’s opinion to two individuals as (cc) unknown to Strouse, by name, address, and or purpose: 1) James P. Nolan, Jr. Esquire, and 2) Benjamin D. Leibowitz, Esquire.  Surely if these two individuals, whomever they are or represent, can know the name and address of Strouse, Strouse is clearly entitled to know their full names and complete addresses, and who they represent (attachment 1).

 

Pages 1-5 of Judge Lawson’s Opinion:

Since Strouse was refused copies of the “Summons” documents by the Sayreville Municipal Court (Ms. Lesinski) on June 2, 2010, at signing, Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the accuracy of the Plaintiffs’ names vis-à-vis the Summons Nos. contained in pages 1-5 of the Opinion. 

Strouse notes, however, that there remain four Citizen Complaints against Raymond J. Sauter that have yet to be assigned “Summons Nos.”, and despite repeated requests to the various Courts, no Court has yet provided Strouse a response as to the status of those four complaints (attachment 5). 

Additionally, as noted by Judge Lawson, a complaint filed by another citizen was incorrectly included in the complaints filed by Strouse, suggesting a continuing problem with frivolous conduct and harassment on the part of the various Courts (attachment 6).

The Court is in error by declaring that this was a “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing.” and prohibiting Strouse from presenting his evidence in support of his 61 criminal complaints.  In so declaring, the Court violated Strouse’s due process.  Based on the Rules of the Court cited by Judge Lawson, there is no such thing as a “non-evidentiary” probable cause hearing. The words “non-evidentiary” are not found in the Rules.  Additionally, the Rule cited by Judge Lawson upon which he found no probable cause was deleted effective January 1, 1995 (Rule 3:3-2).  As such, the Court’s finding of no probable cause must be vacated.

 

I.          STATEMENT OF FACTS (these comments by Strouse in direct response to the Court)

            Following an ORDER by Chief Justice Stuart Rabner, Strouse located the trial court in Sayreville that would accept his criminal complaints.  Strouse filed 61 criminal complaints against 12 public servants and three others, for various crimes, including murder, in February 2010.  In late May 2010, Strouse was called by the Sayreville Municipal Court announcing that the 61 criminal complaints were ready to be signed; June 2, 2010 was the date of signing.  There were four complaints[1] against Raymond J. Sauter that Ms. Lesinski said the Court would have to make a decision on, and that that would happen in time.  Ms. Lesinski withheld those four complaints from signature, and to this day, Strouse awaits the Court’s decision on those four Complaints (attachment 5). 

 

Page 6:

Lines 13-19:  The Court states “This matter comes before the Court for a probable cause determination on the citizen Complaints filed by William H. Strouse (hereinafter, “Mr. Strouse”) against multiple defendants in connection with the death and suspicious death investigation of Mr. Strouse’s sister, Joyce Sauter (hereinafter, “Mrs. Sauter”). The Court’s statement should read: “This matter comes before….in connection with the SUSPICIOUS death and suspicious death investigation….” (attachments 7, 8, and 20).

Reporting a death is everyone’s responsibility, including Strouse’s and Ausley’s.  The State Medical Examiner Act, 52:17B-89. Report of death; violation; provides the basis upon which Strouse and Ausley have an obligation and the authority to report a “suspicious death”:

 

Any person who may become aware of any death by criminal

violence or by accident or suicide or in any suspicious or unusual

manner, shall report such death to the office of the county medical

examiner, the office of the State Medical Examiner, or the 

police of the municipality in which such person died. (emphasis added)

 

Any person who shall willfully neglect or refuse to report such

death, or who, without an order from the office of county medical

examiner or the office of the State Medical Examiner, shall

willfully touch, remove or disturb the body of any such person, or

touch, remove or disturb the clothing upon or near such body,

is a disorderly person.

 

Lines 19-20:  The Court makes reference to “trial briefs”.  Strouse is not aware of “the trial briefs” read by the Court.  There has been no trial regarding the 61 criminal complaints.  Such information was unknown to Strouse and to his knowledge was not discussed on January 11, 2011, as Judge Lawson refused to permit Strouse to present any evidence, though the Court acknowledged Strouse brought 3 boxes for the court to keep and review.

 

Page 6:

I.          STATEMENT OF FACTS

            (no comments)

Page 7:

Lines 1-2:  Judge Lawson was not privy to any “facts” relating to any of the 61 Citizen Complaints filed by Strouse, other than what is mentioned in Strouse’s 61 criminal complaints.  As such, Strouse is confused as to how the Court plans to ”individually provide the facts underlying the Complaints against each individual.” The only facts Judge Lawson had were the 61 Criminal Complaints signed by Strouse on June 2, 2010, at the Sayreville Municipal Court. Judge Lawson refused to permit Strouse to “provide the facts underlying the Complaints against each individual.”  Judge Lawson told Strouse that the hearing was not “an evidentiary probable cause hearing” and thus Strouse was not permitted to present any evidence in support of his statements (attachment 4).

Lines 4 & 5:  Mrs. Sauter had a State of New Jersey end of life agreement in effect at the time of her death (attachment 9), which appointed Raymond J. Sauter as primarily responsible for Mrs. Sauter’s physical and mental health needs.  At one point in the hearing, Judge Lawson suggested that because of the age of the document, the document might not be valid.  Such pondering by the Court seems to weigh in on the side of the defendant.  The end of life agreement was current according to Deby Bath, Mrs. Sauter’s daughter. The Court suggests that Mr. and Mrs. Sauter may have had a secret agreement not known to anyone else, different from the written agreement, alleviating Mr. Sauter from responsibility to care for Mrs. Sauter (attachment 4 and attachment 9); this suggestion has no basis in fact.  Strouse wonders why the Court is defending the defendant.  The Court also opined that at what point would Mr. Sauter be able to make the decision to end his wife’s life (attachment 4), a question not pertinent to this discussion, since Mrs. Sauter’s end of life agreement was still valid.  Mrs. Sauter’s directive dictated the terms of her living and dying and Sauter was compelled to follow those terms; he did not.  The Court heard testimony from Strouse that Sauter stated, while Mrs. Sauter was still living, “The plan for Joyce is to die.” Sauter carried out the plan.

Lines 6 & 7:  Judge Lawson does not provide the full quote, which should read, “Based on my clinical expertise and in consultation with the Central New Jersey hospice Interdisciplinary Team, I certify that the above named patient has a terminal illness with a prognosis of six months or less if the illness runs its course.” (attachment 8).  The key words omitted by the Court are “…if the illness runs its course.”  Mrs. Sauter had already beaten the first estimate of her demise, given in January 2005, of eight months.

            Raymond J. Sauter

Lines 9-25: One criminal complaint was discussed at the hearing on January 11, 2011; the complaint discussed was Murder, as presented by Judge Lawson (attachment 4). It is completely unclear from Judge Lawson’s Opinion exactly what Citizen Complaints/Criminal Complaints regarding Sauter he is making reference to herein., though we will presume its murder.  The Court states in the audio CD that the complaint discussed focused on Frederick J. DiCarlo, M.D., the Assistant Medical Examiner for Middlesex County.

Ausley and Strouse also discussed the subject of starvation and dehydration of Mrs. Sauter with her daughter, Deby Bath.  Ms. Bath made it clear that she had no say in the matter, and in her response to a motion in Superior Court in Middlesex County, made it clear to Judge Travis Francis that Mr. Sauter was solely responsible for her mother’s care (attachment 10).

Starving or dehydrating someone to death is against the law.  Special diets exist for people with special medical problems, cancer included.  Inquiry of Sauter was made regarding what diet Mrs. Sauter was placed on following multiple discharges from the hospital or visits to her doctors; Sauter had no response.  Sauter noted in the Sayreville Police Supplemental Investigation Report (attachment 11) that at one point in time he was able to increase Mrs. Sauter’s weight from 91 pounds to 112 pounds, clearly demonstrating that he was aware of the significance of weight loss and weight gain, and that he had been successful at helping Mrs. Sauter gain considerable weight when Sauter made the effort, demonstrating that he had the knowledge, ability and intent.

At one point, in the Sayreville Police Department report, Sauter reported that he and his step-daughter, Deby Bath, fed Mrs. Sauter with an “eye dropper.” (attachment 11).  Sauter was also referred to the National Cancer Institute and the American Cancer Society, in addition to local dietitians, to develop a diet suitable for someone in Mrs. Sauter’s condition. Sauter refused.  Again, had the Court permitted Strouse, evidence would have been presented in support of his statements.  Though Mrs. Sauter’s end of life agreement provided for her to be fed and hydrated through normal means, the Court makes a futile effort (attachment 4) to try to suggest that the feeding and hydrating efforts discussed by Strouse and Ausley amount simply to a preference by Strouse and Ausley that was different from Mr. Sauter—a suggestion not based on anything but conjecture on the Court’s part.  And why is the Court defending the defendant’s actions?

Regarding a “pain management regiment” (sic) mentioned by Judge Lawson (line 13), Sauter had none, and was not following one provided for Joyce upon her hospital discharges.  Though Frederick J. DiCarlo, M.D., the Middlesex County Medical Examiner, who failed to conduct the mandatory autopsy in accordance with N.J.A.C. Title 13, Chapter 49, and the New Jersey State Medical Examiner Act, stated in his External Examination Report that Mrs. Sauter was on morphine and fentanyl (attachment 8).  Mr. Sauter showed Strouse a yellow legal-sized lined paper wherein he commented that without that sheet of paper he would not be able to remember what medications to give Mrs. Sauter, the amounts, and the times.  The question remains why Mr. Sauter did not follow the medication management program provided by Mrs. Sauter’s physicians. It also remains unclear why Mr. Sauter did not follow the diets proscribed by the hospital physicians upon her discharge from treatment. It is clear that Mr. Sauter had other intentions in mind and a more sinister outcome intended.  And the fact that Mrs. Sauter was not oriented to time, place, and person, and was hallucinating, further supported the need for a pain management program; Mrs. Sauter was clearly being over-medicated.    Again, Judge Lawson refused to let Strouse provide evidence in support of his comments.  Remember that Sauter stated that “The plan for Joyce is to die.”

The Court, throughout its opinion on Page 7 for example, continues to use words such as “alleges” and “claims”.  For example, line 13 and line 16 “Mr. Strouse alleges…” and line 20 Mr. Strouse claims ….”  The Court also uses Mr. Strouse’s citizen complaints content as the basis for presenting its “facts”, yet the Court does not give any credibility to Mr. Strouse’s allegations and claims, a seeming double-standard use of “facts”.  It is testimony—a fact—that Ms. Bath stated that Mr. Sauter was alone in the house at the time of Mrs. Sauter’s death.  It is also a fact that Sauter waited an hour and twenty-two minutes before calling the police and an hour and thirteen minutes before calling a hospice nurse.  Regarding the latter, the Court was invited to look at the Sayreville Police Incident Report (attachment 12) that documented that specific information—but theCourt did not want to confirm the facts that did not support the outcome the Court was seeking at this hearing.

Had the Court permitted Mr. Strouse to present his facts to the Court, the Court would not only have had the actual facts in hand, but would also be able to state with certainty that Mr. Strouse’s allegations and claims were based on evidence proving that the crimes were  committed beyond a reasonable doubt, or at least to the point of passing the reasonable person test, necessary for referral to a Probable Cause hearing by a prosecutor and a grand jury.

 

Page 8:

Lines 1-11: Regarding the information stated by Judge Lawson in lines 1-11, where is Judge Lawson obtaining his “facts” from?  Is it possible he is obtaining his facts from the information contained in the Citizen Complaints filed by Strouse?  Where else would the Court obtain this information from?  Why is it that some of the facts are “alleged by Strouse” or “claimed by Strouse”, and then the Court reports other information from the Citizen Complaints as if they were facts, the very facts reported by Strouse?  Some “facts” fit the Court’s intent and some facts seemingly do not.

Lines 1-3:  Setting the Court’s record straight.  Strouse was notified by Bath almost three hours after Joyce’s reported death.  When Strouse asked Bath why she waited three hours to tell him that his sister had died, Bath had no answer.  No one ever questioned either Bath or Sauter why they waited one hour and twenty-two minutes before they called police following Mrs. Sauter’s death, nor one hour and thirteen minutes before they called hospice.  The reason, of course, was to make sure Mrs. Sauter was dead, as Mr. Sauter was alone in the house with her at the time of her death (said Sauter and Bath), and full-time (24/7) nursing care was to begin the very next day. 

Though Eric M. Aronowitz, the First Deputy County Counsel for Middlesex County, falsely swore in Superior Court Middlesex County that Mrs. Sauter’s suspicious death was never reported as suspicious (attachment 13), a suspicious death report was taken and a suspicious death “investigation” was begun by the Sayreville Police Department, as reported by Lt. Brennan and Det Sprague; these two also reported (attachment 7) a suspicious death to the Middlesex County Medical Examiner’s Office—specifically Frederick J. DiCarlo, M.D.  In his External Examination Report (attachment 8), the same one Judge Lawson refused to permit Strouse to present into evidence at the probable cause hearing, Dr. DiCarlo directs that the Sayreville Police Department and the Middlesex County Prosecutors Office must conduct the necessary suspicious death investigations.  Both the N.J.A.C. (13:49-5.1 Death investigations, conduct) and the Medical Examiner Act (52:17B-87 Notification of county medical examiner and prosecutor) make reference to the County Prosecutor’s Office being involved early on in the investigation of a suspicious death. As noted in the criminal complaints, Kaplan and Lamb knowingly and purposely refused to participate in the mandatory suspicious death investigation.  It is also noted that in her investigation Dep Attorney General Denise Hollingsworth defended Kaplan and Lamb in stating that they waited over 80 days before they decided not to conduct the mandatory investigation (attachments 15 and 16).  What happens to the crime scene and the evidence over 80 days? 

Dr. DiCarlo authored his final (External Examination) report on January 27, 2006, which is also the date he falsified Mrs. Sauter’s Certificate of Death (attachment 17 and attachment 21), evidence that Judge Lawson would  not permit Strouse to present to the Court.  It should be noted that Dr. DiCarlo violated a number of laws and failed to conduct proper forensic practice[2], evidence that Strouse would have presented to the Court had the Court permitted and evidence that would have supported the criminal complaints filed against DiCarlo and all the other public servants.

Herein lies the beginning of the conspiracy.  As noted by Judge Lawson (where did he get his information from?), Dr. DiCarlo removed four specimens from Mrs. Sauter’s body as part of his External Examination (attachment 8). However, DiCarlo only requested that two of the four specimens be analyzed:  blood and urine.  The two specimens that could have exonerated Sauter from being charged with starvation,  dehydration, over medication, and suffocation (all the criminal complaints) were knowingly and purposely not tested.  This is evidence that Strouse would have presented in Court, had Judge Lawson so permitted.   Why wouldn’t DiCarlo test the two specimens that could exonerate Sauter?  What was DiCarlo afraid he would find?

Because a suspicious death was reported to and was being investigated by Dr. DiCarlo (and the Sayreville Police Department), Dr. DiCarlo was compelled to conduct a mandatory autopsy per N.J.A.C. Title 13, Chapter 49, 13:49-1.1 Mandatory Autopsies (a) and knowingly and purposely did not.  The N.J.A.C., Title 13 Law and Public Safety, Chapter 49. State Medical Examiner, (13:49-1.5 Medical Examiner Autopsies) defines the least intrusive autopsy as follows:

(d) Except as provided in (c) above, the autopsy standard for apparent

homicides, suicides, suspicious death, and deaths from no visible

anatomic cause shall include a complete inspection, removal and

dissection of the cranial compartment and contents, the neck viscera

and tongue, the thoracic, abdominal and pelvic compartments and

viscera, and any additional dissections which may be indicated by the

circumstances of the death….”

 

Dr. DiCarlo notes on the initial certificate of death for Mrs. Sauter that he did not conduct an autopsy (attachment 21) ; he also acknowledges in a letter to Carolyn Ausley (Mrs. Sauter’s sister), that he did not conduct the mandatory autopsy (attachment 22), in violation of State law.  At another time he swears, in Superior Court, Middlesex County, through Eric M. Aronowitz, that he did conduct an autopsy (attachments 17 and 23).  DiCarlo then falsely certified on a change to Mrs. Sauter’s certificate of death that, based on an autopsy that was never conducted, that Mrs. Sauter died a natural death from cancer (attachment 17).  Nowhere in his External Examination Report does DiCarlo address cancer as the cause of death.  Further, once DiCarlo completed his External Examination, he immediately released Mrs. Sauter’s body (on November 1, 2005) to the person alleged to have murdered her—Sauter, in violation of common sense and N.J.A.C. Title 13, Chapter 49, 13:49-5.1 Death Investigations:

The duty medical examiner shall take complete charge of every body whose

death is reported to the office, and shall not release it to the next of kin or

authorized representative for burial or cremation until sufficient information

has been accumulated, proper specimens and evidence have been collected

as needed, and appropriate examinations have been conducted to establish

the cause and manner of death and the identity of the decedent.

 

As can be seen from Dr. DiCarlo’s External Examination Report, his Final Report was dated January 27, 2006, which is the date he falsely changed Mrs. Sauter’s certificate of death to reflect cancer as the cause of death (attachments 17 and 21).  In order to prove the manner and cause of death beyond a reasonable doubt in a suspicious death case, an autopsy is mandatory.

Lines 11-19:  Where is Judge Lawson obtaining his facts from?  According to the Court, Strouse’s comments are allegations and claims, which the Court refuses to believe, or refuses to permit Strouse to provide the evidence in support of his statement, yet the Court somehow presents all this other information as fact.  Is this prejudice or bias?

Remember that DiCarlo was mandated by law to conduct an autopsy and not just an External Examination.  In spite of the fact that DiCarlo had the specimens over a year while the Court case moved along, and could have tested the very specimens he retained but had not tested, he could have tested them and avoided the subsequent legal battle for Mrs. Sauter’s specimens.  Additionally, as Natarajan, DiCarlo, and Falzon knew, the Medical Examiner’s Office also could have sent the specimens to another State Toxicology Lab that was properly certified, in accordance with New Jersey law; they chose not to (New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiner, Statutes and Regulations, p.94, Para 45:9-42.42. c).  Why?

Lines 21-24:  It appears on the surface that the Court has chosen what facts to accept and what facts to deny; the facts presented by the Court are slanted, incomplete, and biased, so as to achieve the Court’s intended outcome of finding no probable cause.  Strouse cannot affirm or deny what Summons Nos. are applicable for Sauter, as written, since the Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons.

 

Page 9:

Lines 1-6:  The Citizen Complaints listed in the Courts Opinion are neither accurately nor fully representative, suggesting a continued bias on the part of the Court.  Strouse alleges that Raymond J. Sauter committed the following crimes:  (1) Conspiracy 2C:5-2.a(1) ETC. (DiCarlo, Kaplan, Lamb, Sprague, Noble); (2) Murder 2C:11-3.a (1); (3) Abandonment, Neglect of Elderly Person, Disabled Adult 2C:24-8.1 ETC.; (4) Hindering One’s Own Apprehension or Prosecution 2C:29-3.b ETC.; and (5) Liability for Another’s Conduct 2C:2-6.a.b.c. ETC. (DiCarlo, Sayreville Police Department, Kaplan, and Lamb)[3].  Strouse did not/not file a criminal complaint against Raymond J. Sauter for Falsifying or Tampering with Records, contrary to N.J.S.A 2C:21-4 (a), as reported by the Court in its Opinion.  This is another example of frivolous conduct or harassment on the part of the Court.

The Court forced Strouse to make a painful effort to identify a motive for Sauter to murder Mrs. Sauter (see 2-disk CD), when the State of New Jersey does not require that the State prove motive in a murder case.[4]  In response to the Court’s numerous questions, Strouse clearly demonstrated to the Court, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Sauter, by his own conduct, (1) stated that “The plan for Joyce was to die”. (2) Knew that if he withheld food, the outcome was that Mrs. Sauter would die of starvation; (3) Knew that if he withheld hydration, the outcome was that Mrs. Sauter would die of dehydration, and (3) knew that if he continued to keep Mrs. Sauter heavily medicated, she would not eat or drink.  Additionally, Strouse testified that both he and Ausley specifically told Sauter and Bath that to withhold food and hydration from Mrs. Sauter would cause her death.  Sauter, as sole responsible caretaker for Mrs. Sauter, told Strouse that he (Strouse) was not a doctor and to mind his own business, specifically stating in a telephone conversation, “What is, is.  What is will be.  That is that.”  While Strouse, according to the Court, “alleged” this, and “claimed” that, and “opined” something else, the forensic evidence (attachment 20), acknowledged by the Court earlier, concluded that Mrs. Sauter was dehydrated and in a prolonged fasting or starvation condition at the time of her death.  Recall that Sauter stated that “The plan for Joyce is to die.”  Sauter was successful. 

Regarding suppression of evidence, as mentioned by the Court, when DiCarlo released Mrs. Sauter’s body to the alleged murderer on November 1, 2005 (attachments 8 and 25), prior to the return of the specimen analysis (which occurred on November 29, 2005), and prior to the completion of his investigation (which is noted by Dr. DiCarlo to be January 27, 2006), in violation of the law, Sauter had Mrs. Sauter cremated on the same day (attachment 25).  That is not an allegation, that is a fact that the Court refused to permit Strouse to enter into evidence so as to continue to benefit and protect Sauter from investigation.  As noted by the Judge Lawson, Sauter, in his response motion in Superior Court, Middlesex County, opposed release of the specimens to Ausley, and subsequently lost on appeal.  It was noted by Judge Francis’ and Judge Reisner’s Courts that Sauter had no interest in the specimens until Ausley requested release for completing testing that DiCarlo was obligated to have ordered, but knowingly and purposely chose not, in violation of the NJ State Medical Examiner Act and NJAC Title 13, Chapter 49.

 

Page 10:

            Frederick J. DiCarlo, M.D. (Assistant Medical Examiner at the relevant time (and for the past 2 years, apparently the Medical Examiner for Monmouth County under a sharing contract with Middlesex County) (attachment 32)

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The 10 Complaints against Dr. DiCarlo were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future, or the appointment of a special prosecutor.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on DiCarlo (attachment 32).  This evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.

Lines 1-5:  Both Lt. Brennan and Det Sprague contacted the Medical Examiner’s Office reporting a suspicious death on the night of October 29, 2005 (attachment 12).  Following that contact, Dr. DiCarlo told both the Sayreville Police Department and the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office (attachment eight) that they needed to conduct the mandatory suspicious death investigation, as required by the New Jersey Administrative Code, Title 13, Chapter 49, and the New Jersey State Medical Examiner’s Act (the “Act”).  The Sayreville Police Department initiated something akin to an investigation.  In violation of the NJAC (13:49-5.1 Death Investigations, conduct) and the  Act  (52:17B-86, Investigation of deaths; causes and 52:17B-87, Notification of county medical examiner and prosecutor) the Middlesex County Prosecutors Office knowingly and purposely did nothing (attachments 15 and 16).  Their intentional omission in refusing to conduct the mandatory investigation was material as it was as much a duty and responsibility inherent in their jobs.

Lines 6-16:  As noted in the Courts Opinion, DiCarlo violated the Act by not conducting the mandatory autopsy and only conducting an external examination.  While taking four specimens from Mrs. Sauter, the Court correctly notes that DiCarlo requested analysis of only two of the four specimens (blood and urine) and did not request analysis of the two specimens that could have exonerated Sauter (liver and vitreous). 

Also in violation of the Act, DiCarlo released Mrs. Sauter’s body to the alleged murderer, Sauter, before the return of the specimen analysis by the State Tox Lab (attachment 19), thus preventing additional testing should foul play be determined.  And, as noted by the date on DiCarlo’s final report (January 27, 2006), he also released the evidence prior to the completion of his investigation N.J.A.C. 13:49-5.1 (c), another violation intended to benefit and protect Sauter and all the other public servants charged herein, from investigation.  To date, including this Court, all have been successful. Not one public servant has been investigated.  Only Deby Bath, Mrs. Sauter’s daughter, has been Mirandized and investigated. DiCarlo violated all these laws, and others, to benefit Sauter and the other public servants, while protecting Sauter from investigation of Mrs. Sauter’s suspicious death.  These acts by DiCarlo were and remain material and clearly support the charges made by Strouse.  His failure to perform proper forensic practice inherent in his position was material and caused all family members irreparable harm.

 

 

Page 10:

Lines 17-24:  Contrary to what is written in the Opinion, and according to Dr. DiCarlo’s External Examination Report, finalized January 27, 2006, Dr. DiCarlo did not conduct any tests on Mrs. Sauter.  This was a false statement made and perpetuated by Eric M. Aronowitz (attachment 13) in a response motion in Superior Court, Middlesex County, for which Strouse has filed a criminal complaint.  All tests were conducted by the State Toxicology Lab.  Though Dr. DiCarlo received the State Tox Lab report on November 29, 2005, he did not complete his investigation until January 27, 2006.  It is on that date that he falsely certified a new manner and cause of death for Mrs. Sauter.  It is on that date that Dr. DiCarlo falsely certified that the manner of death was “natural” and the cause of death was “bilateral non-small cell carcinoma of lungs with lymph node involvement and metastases.” (attachments 17 and 21)  As the Court knows, such a conclusion would only be possible had DiCarlo conducted the mandatory autopsy—which official government records and his own admission, show he did not.

This false certification is ignored by Judge Lawrence, who incorrectly and prejudicially reports it as fact, so as to support his intended outcome.  As noted by Judge Lawson, Dr. DiCarlo relies on three items to support his new certification: (1) autopsy; (2) toxicology; (3) histology.  Had Judge Lawson permitted the presentation of evidence Strouse brought to what he thought was going to be a probable cause hearing, the Court would have learned the following.  First, as Dr. DiCarlo certified on October 31, 2005, Certificate of Death for Joyce B. Sauter, no autopsy was conducted (attachment 21).  Second, the toxicology report from the State Toxicology  Lab is completely silent on a cause or manner of death for Mrs. Sauter, simply reporting on the blood and urine status, and nothing else (attachment 19).  Finally, histology, the study of tissues, is a non-event in this case, as no histological studies were requested by DiCarlo in reference to the four specimens submitted for analysis, and histology was not a part of the External Exam conducted by DiCarlo on October 31, 2005 (attachment 8).  Judge Lawson presented just half the facts.  The Court’s presenting select “facts” leads a reasonable person to conclude that there quite possibly is bias and prejudice on the part of the Court.

 

Page 11:

Lines 4-6:  As the Courts have refused to provide Strouse copies of the Summons Nos.[5] he is unable to confirm or deny that the listed Summon numbers agree with the listed complaints.  There is another reporting error on the part of this Court.  One complaint filed by Strouse, False Reports to Law Enforcement Authorities (2C:28-4.a.b. (1)(2)) is listed incorrectly by the Court as, ”Falsely Incriminating Another” (2C:28-4 (a)”.  This continues the pattern of frivolous conduct and harassment on the part of the Courts.  It also brings into question the accuracy and reliability of this Court’s decision-making process, and makes one begin to question the Court’s Professional Conduct.

Lines 20-24:  These complaints were not heard on January 11, 2011.  No evidence was permitted to be submitted to the Court, though Strouse and Ausley made an effort to leave three boxes of evidence with Judge Lawson; he refused to accept them.  In response to the Opinion of the Court, Strouse provides the following comments.  Again, evidence to support all of Strouse’s comments was available for Judge Lawson, but he refused stating that it was not an “evidentiary probable cause hearing.”[6]  What was the purpose of the hearing then, if not to permit Strouse to provide evidence to support his complaints? 

Had the Court been willing to accept evidence brought to the hearing by Strouse, the Court would have confirmed that documents certified by Dr. DiCarlo show that he did not conduct the mandatory autopsy (attachments 8, 17, 19, and 22).  Not only did Dr. DiCarlo certify on October 31, 2005, that he did not conduct and autopsy, he also sent Carolyn Ausley a letter on December 27, 2007 (attachment 22), admitting that he only conducted an External Examination, in violation of the N.J.A.C. and the Act. The Court refers to Strouse’s statement as an “allegation”.  Strouse also noted that there is nothing in the NJ State Tox Lab Report that addresses cancer, and the Court refused to accept a copy of the report supporting Strouse’s statement.  The Court refers to Strouse’s statement as a “claim”, suggesting it is not factual.

 

Page 12

Lines 1-3:  The Court again reports that Strouse “alleges” that no histological studies were conducted by DiCarlo as evidenced in the NJ State Tox Lab Report on blood and urine, received by DiCarlo on November 29, 2011 (attachment 19).  Had Judge Lawson permitted Strouse to present the evidence, the Court would have concluded Strouse’s statements were factual beyond a reasonable doubt, as the evidence was a NJ State-produced document.

 

 

 

Page 12:

            Geetha Ann Natarajan, M.D. (Medical Examiner Middlesex County at the relevant time and direct supervisor of Dr. DiCarlo) (attachment 32)

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The two Complaints against Dr. Natarajan were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse against Dr. Natarajan.  This evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof. 

Dr. Natarajan knowingly and purposely failed to perform her sworn duties.  Had Dr. Natarajan properly performed duties and responsibilities inherent in her role as Medical Examiner and Dr. DiCarlo’s supervisor, she would have ensured from the outset that Dr. DiCarlo followed all the rules and regulations required for investigation of a suspicious death, including the conduct of the mandatory autopsy for the suspicious death investigation, a material omission on her part.  Her omissions were material and contributed to the irreparable harm caused to Mrs. Sauter’s family. Since these complaints were not discussed at the probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011, they cannot be dismissed by Judge Lawson.

 

Page 12:

            Jeffrey Sprague, Detective (Sayreville Police Department)

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The three Complaints against Det Sprague were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Sprague.  This evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.

 

Page 12:

Lines 21-24:  Strouse initially reported the suspicious death of Mrs. Sauter to the NJ State Police, who said to contact the South Amboy Police, who told Mr. Strouse to contact the Sayreville Police Department.  Mr. Strouse first reported the suspicious death to Lt. Brennan.  Strouse reported the suspicious death to Brennan, including the fact that Raymond J. Sauter, the alleged murderer, was a former police officer and may have weapons in a basement safe.  The suspicious death was again reported to Det Sprague when Sprague phoned Strouse on the night of October 29, 2005.

 

Page 13:

Lines 1-7:  The information stated by the Court is correct. It should be noted that there is no indication that Sauter, a former police officer, asked any questions as to why Det Sprague was knocking on his door at 11:30 PM, after having awakened Sauter, asking the whereabouts of Mrs. Sauter’s body.  Sprague would have the reader believe that Sauter just gave Sprague the address of the funeral home and went back to bed.  The Court knows that a former police officer would be asking all kinds of questions  about why the police want to know where his deceased wife’s body is.  The evidence, which Judge Lawson did not want to see nor would he accept for later analysis, would have confirmed this (attachment 7). 

Line 8:  The Court significantly understates the complexity of the reasons Strouse filed complaints against Sprague; it was not for the few important reasons provided by the Court but rather includes many other direct and circumstantial facts found in the Sayreville Supplemental Investigation Reports filed by both Sprague and Det Amy Noble, especially Bath’s Miranda statement.  Other evidence, available to the Court but rejected by it at the hearing, included some of the following: Sprague did not corroborate any statements made by Sauter, Deby Bath, appropriate persons in the Medical Examiner’s Office, appropriate persons in the County Prosecutor’s Office, Candice Boehler-Marquette and any others; Sprague, though informed by Strouse that Sauter caused Mrs. Sauter’s suspicious death, concluded that Deby Bath was the suspect or accused, and Mirandized her instead.  In conducting the Miranda interview, Sprague asked 101 questions, only 20 of which specifically pertained to the suspicious death investigation; Sprague did not contact Boehler’s therapist to confirm that Boehler had been in therapy for years as a result of being abused by Sauter; Sprague did not confront either Boehler or Bath regarding Boehler’s August 2, 2005, email wherein Boehler accuses Sauter of abusing her and Mrs. Sauter for years; Sprague ignores Boehler’s concern that a telephone interview was or was not being recorded and then she denies the abuse occurred; Sprague asks Boehler if she was ever abused physically, mentally, emotionally or sexually and Boehler answer no.  Sprague had the email in front of him at the time and Sprague knew that Boehler had not accused Sauter of sexual abuse—it was easy for Boehler to deny the question.; Sprague permitted Bath, in the Miranda, to complain about Strouse and Ausley and did not confront Bath about any specific issues;  Sprague’s questions of Bath in the Miranda regarding information provided by Strouse and Ausley consisted mostly of “are you aware of letters, and faxes, and an email” received by the Sayreville Police Department, without discussing any of the specific allegations; in other words, Sprague punched a ticket so as to be able to say he Mirandized someone, and asked 101 questions, and obtained no useful information, except to discount everything Strouse or Ausley said.  Not one word of corroboration.  Based on these facts, and facts contained in all the other evidence the Court refused to accept on January 11, 2011, Strouse filed the criminal complaints against Det Sprague, and the others.

Lines:  9-16:  In response to the Court, Strouse provides the following comments.  The complaints as reported by Judge Lawson on page 13 are again incorrect.  Strouse filed the following criminal complaints against Sprague: (1) Conspiracy 2C:5-2.a ETC; (2) Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution of Another 2C:29-1.a ETC; and (3) Official Misconduct 2C:30-2.a. ETC.

Contrary to what the Court reports herein, Strouse did not file the following complaint against Det. Sprague:  (2) Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function as noted on lines 12-13 in the Opinion.  This is another mistake by the Court and amounts to continued frivolous conduct and harassment. It also clearly brings into question the Court’s ability to accurately and factually render a valid Opinion in this, or any other matter.

Lines 17-21:  Strouse provided accurate and truthful comments regarding who was and who was not a target or suspect in the suspicious death case (attachment 28).  Sprague had Bath sign her name on the Miranda statement above the words “accused or suspect”.   Had the Court been so inclined to accept the evidence offered by Strouse, the Court would have seen the Supplemental Investigation Reports showing that nothing was done on the suspicious death investigation case by Sprague between October 30, 2005, and December 22, 2005.  It is in the official police reports.

Lines 22-24:  It is a matter of fact that Mrs. Sauter’s body was released to the alleged murderer by Dr. DiCarlo, in violation of the law, immediately after DiCarlo completed his External Examination, and that Mrs. Sauter was cremated by Sauter on November 1, 2005 (attachments 8 and 25).  As the lead investigator in the case, Sprague had an inherent duty and responsibility to ensure that Mrs. Sauter’s body remained protected until DiCarlo completed his investigation—an investigation which DiCarlo’s records shows was not completed until January 27, 2006 (attachment 8).  Sprague, knowing that he was investigating a suspicious death, also knew that an autopsy was required to be conducted by DiCarlo (N.J.A.C. Title 13, Chapter 49 and the Act).  Sprague knowingly and purposely permitted DiCarlo to release Mrs. Sauter’s body, the primary evidence, to the alleged murderer, so that the mandatory autopsy would not be conducted and so as to have the evidence destroyed and to benefit Sauter.

 

Page 14:

Lines 1-8:  As lead detective Sprague had an inherent duty and responsibility to coordinate with the Prosecutor’s office and ensure he was conducting its mandatory investigation, as directed by Dr. DiCarlo on the evening of October 29, 2005 (attachments 7 and 8).  Sprague failed to ensure that Kaplan and Lamb were conducting their investigation, and when learning they were not conducting an investigation, Sprague (and Noble and Brennan and Garbowski) purposely and knowing ignored their omission,, as did DiCarlo.  Likewise, both Strouse and Ausley had key information for Sprague and DiCarlo and others involved in the investigation, yet Sprague made no effort to followup with interviews or corroborate information obtained during the investigation, for example, with Bath and Boehler.  Though Strouse spoke on the telephone with Dr. DiCarlo on/about January 6, 2005, DiCarlo ignored everything Strouse told him, (attachment 8) including specifically the information contained in Boehler’s August 2, 2005, email (attachment 29) to Carolyn Ausley, which Strouse provided to DiCarlo.  All of this factual information was available to Judge Lawson on January 11, 2011 and he refused to let Strouse present it.  These complaints were not discussed at the probable cause hearing and thus cannot be dismissed. There is no mention in Rules of the Court of a “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing.”, as cited by the Court.

 

Page 14:

            Det. Amy Noble (Sayreville Police Department)

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The three Complaints against Det Amy Noble were not discussed on January 11, 2011.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  In response to the Court, Strouse provides the following comments. 

The complaints as reported by Judge Lawson on page 13 are incorrect.  Again the Court makes another mistake.  The Court has again confused the complaints filed by Strouse.  For example, Complaints filed against Det Noble include the following: (1) Conspiracy 2C:5-2 ETC; (2) Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution of Another 2C-29-1 ETC.; and, (3) Official Misconduct 2C:30-2.a ETC.  Contrary to what the Court states in its opinion, Strouse did not file a complaint against Noble, as noted by the Court on line 16 for “(2) Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a).” This continues the pattern of frivolous conduct and harassment on the part of the Court.  It also brings into question the Court’s ability to adequately and accurately review information and render opinions.  If the Court cannot keep track of the various criminal cases that come before it, how can the Court represent itself, and its decisions, as creditable?

Lines 21-24: The Court states that Strouse “alleges” that Noble followed the lead of Sprague.  The Court, had it permitted Strouse to refer to his evidence brought to the probable cause hearing, would have clearly seen that Sprague was the lead detective and that Noble played a support role.  Supplemental Investigation Report dated 12-22-2005 (attachment 26) shows that Noble acknowledges that she was told by Sprague to speak with four persons:  Bath, Boehler-Marquette, Ausley, and Strouse. 

 

Page 15:

Lines 1-4:  The Court reports that Strouse alleges that Noble never called Strouse, but such allegation by the Court is again inaccurate. As noted by Noble in the report, she had nothing to say to Strouse when she spoke with him, except to ask him for Boehler-Marquette’s telephone number (attachment 26).  The Court would have known this had the Court permitted Strouse to use the evidence he brought for the probable cause hearing.  The interviews noted by the court which were conducted by Noble must be read to appreciate their staged quality (attachment 26 and 27) The Court will easily see through both Sprague’s and Noble’s efforts by knowingly and purposely couching numerous questions to protect Sauter, and themselves.  Since this complaint was not discussed at the probable cause hearing it cannot be dismissed.  This complaint is not dependent upon other complaints and stands alone.

 

Page 15:

            LT. Timothy Brennan (Sayreville Police Department)

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The one Complaint against LT Brennan was not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Brennan.  This evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.  Since this complaint was not discussed at the probable cause hearing, it cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 15-16:

            Captain John Garbowski (Chief of Sayreville Police Department at the relevant time)

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The one Complaint against Captain Garbowski was not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Garbowski.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.

 

Page 16:

            Lines 1-7:  Captain Garbowski had a duty and responsibility inherent in his position to properly supervise his subordinates and/or those working on cases within his jurisdiction; he failed to do so (Brennan, Sprague, and Noble).  Knowing that Sauter was a former police officer with the Dunellen Police Department should have made Garbowski more sensitive towards providing appropriate oversight and supervision.  His knowing and purposeful omission of such oversight was derelict, material, and caused irreparable harm to Mrs. Sauter’s family, thus supporting charges of official misconduct.  Since this complaint was not discussed at the probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011, it cannot be dismissed.

 

            Candace Marquette (Candice Boehler-Marquette)

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The five Complaints against Boehler-Marquette were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Boehler-Marquette.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.

            Lines 8-14:  The information stated by the Court is accurate.

            Lines 15-22: The information stated by the Court is accurate.  However, it is not complete.  The Court fails to note that neither Sprague nor Noble (nor Brennan nor Garbowski nor Kaplan nor Lamb) confronted Boehler about changing her oath, testimony, or affirmation.  Boehler knew this was a suspicious death investigation and knew the seriousness of providing truthful statements.  Sprague did not ask Boehler if she was giving false information to law enforcement, information that contradicted what she stated in her August 2, 2005, email. It is also noted in the Supplemental Investigation  Report that Noble provided Boehler-Marquette a definition of “abuse”, though Noble does not give the definition she provided Boehler-Marquette in her report.  As a result of providing false or inconsistent statements, Boehler-Marquette hindered the apprehension of Sauter and others regarding Mrs. Sauter’s suspicious death.  Her false statements also obstructed the administration of law, and she perjured herself in the process.  Her oath or affirmation enabled Sprague and Noble to keep the focus from Sauter and thus benefited Sauter and the others. Sprague et al just accepted her changed story because it fit their intended outcome, which was to benefit Sauter and others, and avoid an investigation of Sauter.  They were successful.

 

Page 17:

            Lines 1-10: Once again the Court incorrectly records one of the complaints.  Specifically, lines 8-9, as recorded by the Court: “(4) Inconsistent Statements, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2 (c)”.  This should read False Swearing (Inconsistent Statements) 2C:28-2 (c). This error calls into question the Courts ability to provide an accurate assessment of the very limited information discussed at the hearing and provides continuing support for a conclusion that the Court continues with its frivolous conduct and harassment of Strouse.  Since these complaints were not discussed at the probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011, they cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 17:

            Deby Bath (Joyce B. (Strouse) Sauter’s daughter)

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The six Complaints against Deby Bath were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Deby Bath.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.

Line 12:  Once again the Court has made a notable error.  The Court states that “Ms. Bath is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Sauter.”  This is not true.  Mrs. Sauter (Joyce B. (Strouse) Sauter) and Raymond J. Sauter did not/not have any children together.  In fact, Candice Boehler-Marquette, in her email of August 2, 2005, accuses Sauter of abusing Mrs. Sauter to the point of having a miscarriage.  Ms. Deby Bath is Mrs. Sauter’s daughter by a prior marriage.  Such inaccuracies on the part of the Court continues to call into question the Courts ability to provide an accurate assessment of the very limited information discussed at the hearing and provides continuing support for a conclusion that the Court continues with its frivolous conduct and harassment of Strouse.

Lines 16-18:  The Court reports an extremely narrow summary in this case, as it does in all of the others, limiting exposure of the complaint and evidence.  Using this limited summary the Court draws certain conclusions which are not fully representative of the complexity of the complaints and their relationship to one another. Indeed, it appears the Court cites select information to meet its intended outcome, which is to prevent the investigation of Sauter for Mrs. Sauter’s suspicious death, and all the others accused in the 61 criminal complaints.  Additionally, Ms. Bath was not/not a primary caretaker of Mrs. Sauter, as Bath stated to Judge Travis L. Francis in her response to a motion submitted by Carolyn Ausley (attachment10), and as noted on the End of Life agreement signed by Joyce, which directly appointed Sauter as being solely responsible for her medical and mental health care needs.  This information could have been accurately presented to the Court had the Court permitted Strouse to provide the Court with the necessary and available evidence at the time of the hearing.  The Court conveniently omits the fact that neither Sprague nor Noble nor Brennan nor Garbowski confront Bath regarding her denial of abuse, as reported by Boehler-Marquette in the August 2, 2005 email, to wit, “Are you lying now or were you lying then?” This is a knowing and purposeful material omission in the flawed investigative process, not only by the Sayreville Police Department, but also by Dr. DiCarlo (et al) in the Medical Examiners Office, and Kaplan and Lamb in the Prosecutors Office.

Lines 19-24:  The Court comments that “Based on these facts, Mr. Strouse filed one complaint against Ms. Bath ….” There are significantly many more facts available to the Court than those mentioned by the Court in its opinion.  These facts would have been presented to the Court had the Court permitted Strouse to use them. 

Once again the Court errs in documenting the complaints filed by Strouse, this time against Deby Bath. For example, Strouse filed six complaints against Bath.  The Court lists only five.  Missing from the Court listing is the following complaint:  False Swearing (Inconsistent Statements) 2C:28-2.(c). Also, the Court lists one complaint as “(5) Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3 (a) (2).” When it should read as follows:  Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution of Another….”  Such inaccuracies on the part of the Court continues to call into question the Courts ability to provide an accurate assessment of the very limited information discussed at the hearing and provides continuing support for a conclusion that the Court continues with its frivolous conduct and harassment of Strouse.

 

Page 18: 

Lines 5-8:  The Court again uses words to plant seeds in the mind of the reader of this opinion.  In lines 5, 8, 10, 15 the court says that Strouse “alleges” and “claims” certain things happened.  When the Court cites a “fact” however, there are no such words used.   The Court selectively excerpts information from the complaint and this is intended to support its position regarding its intended outcome for this “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing.”  For example, had the Court permitted Strouse to present the August 2, 2005, Boehler-Marquette email, the Court would have concluded that Boehler-Marquette did indeed state that Bath was aware of the abuse at the time it was occurring.  The fact that the Sayreville Police could find no record of an abuse report in their records (contained in one of their Supplemental Investigation Reports not permitted by the Court to be entered into the record and in attachment 8) is also addressed in the 8/2/2005 email wherein Boehler-Marquette comments that she could not go to the police because Sauter was a “cop” and she would have been “killed.” (attachment 29).

Lines 8-18:  Again, the Court makes a limited effort to summarize a complaint.  Had the Court permitted Strouse to refer to and submit the evidence available to the Court at the hearing, the Court would not be using words such as, “Strouse alleges” and/or “he also claims”  The Court would have seen the evidence for itself.  What is reported here by the Court, as allegations and claims, can be proven if an investigation is conducted and by a comparison of statements made by, for example, Bath and Boehler, as shown in the Sayreville Police Department Supplemental Investigation Reports.  All of this evidence was available for the Court; however the Court refused to permit Strouse to use any of it, citing the hearing as “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing.” Ausley and Strouse will testify as to Bath’s stated fear of Sauter.  Since the complaints against Bath were not discussed at the probable cause hearing they cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 18:

            William F. Lamb, Esq. (Middlesex County Prosecutors Office)

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The one Complaint against William Lamb was not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on William Lamb.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.

Lines 21-24:  First, as already proven, an autopsy did not occur in this case (attachments 21 and 30).  While Lamb’s statement is true in the sense that he violated the law by not conducting a suspicious death investigation when directed to do so by Dr. DiCarlo (attachment 8 and 7), it is also false in the sense that, as already a matter of public record, an autopsy was not conducted as mandated by State law.  Additionally, this is contrary to what DAG Denise Hollingsworth reported, based on her investigation (attachment 16), wherein she reported that Lamb and Kaplan waited until the Medical Examiners (DiCarlo) investigation was complete, which was on January 27, 2006, according to DiCarlo’s External Examination Report (attachment 8).  Which of these two public servants are falsely swearing and making inconsistent statements?  The Court is in error again, wherein the Court states on page 18, lines 23-24, and Page 19, lines 1-2, wherein the Court claims that the investigation ”began on January 19, 2006, the date on which Dr. DiCarlo completed his final report.” What investigation began on January 19, 2006?  As already proven, DiCarlo’s final report is dated January 27, 2006.

 

Page 19:

Lines 7-15: An inherent part of the County Prosecutors official duty and responsibility is the conduct of suspicious death investigations, as the Court well knows.  On the evening of October 29, 2005, Dr. DiCarlo directed both the Sayreville Police Department and the Middlesex County Prosecutor to conduct the necessary suspicious death investigation (attachments 8 and 12).  Had this Court permitted Strouse to enter the Police Supplemental Investigation Report (attachment 7) into the record, along with DiCarlo’s External Examination Report (attachment 8), the Court would have seen the truthfulness of the statement by Strouse.  The evidence shows that Lamb and Kaplan knowingly and purposely chose not to conduct the mandatory suspicious death investigation, as noted in Hollingsworth’s review and Lamb’s letter of May 16 and 23, 2006.  It is also a fact that Lamb ignored the improper forensic practices of Dr. DiCarlo. These investigations are inherent in their duties and responsibilities.  Since this complaint was not discussed at the probable cause hearing it cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 19:

            Bruce Kaplan, Esq. (Middlesex County Prosecutors Office)

The Court refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The one Complaint against Bruce Kaplan was not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Bruce Kaplan.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.

Lines17-23:  First, as already proven, an autopsy did not occur in this case. (attachments 21 and 22).  While Kaplan’s statement is true in the sense that he violated the law by not conducting a mandatory suspicious death investigation when directed to do so by Dr. DiCarlo, it is also false in the sense that, as already a matter of public record, an autopsy was not conducted as mandated by State law.  Additionally, this is contrary to what DAG Denise Hollingsworth reported, based on her investigation (attachment 16), who reported that Lamb and Kaplan waited until the Medical Examiners (DiCarlo) investigation was complete, which was on January 27, 2006, according to DiCarlo’s External Examination Report (attachment 8).  Strouse wonders how or where the Court obtained a copy of the Hollingsworth letter such that the Court quotes from it?  It is not lost on Strouse that the Court, when citing material from the public servants, uses words such as “According to” while the Court, when citing material from Strouse, uses words such as “alleges” and “claims.”

 

Page 20:

Lines 4-14:  First, a suspicious death report was taken by Lt. Brennan.  Second, Det. Sprague followed up that suspicious death report conversation between Strouse and Brennan by contacting the Medical Examiners Office and reporting a suspicious death (attachment 7).  In response to DiCarlo receiving a suspicious death report from Sprague, DiCarlo directed that the police and the prosecutors offices had to conduct the mandatory suspicious death investigations (attachment 8).  Though the Court knows that the County Prosecutor has a mandated obligation, inherent in his duty and responsibility, to conduct suspicious death investigations, the Court presents the information as if the Court is hearing it for the first time.  Indeed, not only was Kaplan told by DiCarlo to conduct the necessary suspicious death investigation, but Sprague also had a conversation with an investigator from Kaplan’s office regarding the suspicious death of Mrs. Sauter (attachment 7).  The fact, available in evidence refused by the Court and acknowledged by the Court in this Opinion, is that Kaplan and Lamb knowingly and purposely chose not to conduct the mandatory suspicious death investigation when it was timely to do so.  Had Kaplan and Lamb conducted the mandatory suspicious death investigation inherent in their duties and responsibilities, Sauter would have been investigated for Mrs. Sauter’s suspicious death. Since this complaint was not discussed at the probable cause hearing it cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 20:

            Eric M. Aronowitz, Esq. (1st Dep County Counsel, Middlesex County)

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The six Complaints against Mr. Aronowitz were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Eric M. Aronowitz.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof. 

Lines 16-22: The Court once again provides erroneous information.  Contrary to what the Court states, Mr. Strouse did not pursue a lawsuit against Middlesex County.  Ms. Ausley filed an Order to Show Cause to obtain Mrs. Sauter’s specimens taken from Mrs. Sauter during her External Examination by Dr. DiCarlo, two of which DiCarlo did not have analyzed; Sauter filed to stop release of the specimens and when the release was ordered, he filed an appeal and lost. Evidence, which the Court refused to admit, clearly shows that the Sayreville Police reported a suspicious death to the Medical Examiners Office (both Brennan and Sprague) and the Medical Examiners External Examination Report clearly shows that both the Police and the Prosecutor were directed by DiCarlo to conduct the necessary mandatory suspicious death investigation.  Further, Aronowitz falsely swore in Superior Court, Appellate Division, Middlesex County, that Mrs. Sauter’s death was not reported as suspicious (attachment 13).  Had the Court permitted Strouse to do so, Strouse would have entered into evidence proof beyond a reasonable doubt in support of his statements.  In the same breath, the Court notes that Aronowitz stated (not alleged or claimed) that “complete available toxicology testing was performed by Dr. DiCarlo.” 

This was another false statement in Superior Court by Aronowitz on two counts.  First, though DiCarlo took four specimens from Mrs. Sauter, he requested the NJ State Toxicology Lab to analyze only two of the four—so complete toxicology testing was not performed (attachment 19).  Second, Dr. DiCarlo did not perform any testing on any specimens, and in fact, according to the Lab Report, did  not order the testing that could have exonerated Sauter or convicted him, as he did not want to run the risk of the analysis of the liver and vitreous supporting the allegations made by Strouse that Sauter killed his wife by starvation, dehydration, overmedication, or suffocation.  It was subsequently concluded by an independent Laboratory and Forensic Pathologist that at the time of her death, Mrs. Sauter was in a prolonged fasting and starvation condition and was dehydrated (attachment 20). 

The Court again is in error regarding the complaints Strouse submitted.  Beginning on the bottom of page 20 and carrying over to page 21, please note the following. Strouse did not/not file a complaint against Aronowitz for “Inconsistent Statements, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2 (c)”.   Also, Strouse filed a complaint against Sauter for “Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution of Another, 2C:29-3 (a), not/not simply “Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution”. This error calls into question the Courts ability to provide an accurate assessment of the very limited information discussed at the hearing and provides continuing support for a conclusion that the Court continues with its frivolous conduct and harassment of Strouse.

Pages (21 bottom) 22:

Lines (23) 1-2:  It is a matter of Court records (motions, responses) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Middlesex County, before Judges Travis L. Francis (attachment 10) and Susan L. Reisner (attachments 23 and 30), for example, that Aronowtiz falsely swore that an autopsy had been conducted on Mrs. Sauter, when all the time Aronowitz knew that an autopsy had not been conducted on Mrs. Sauter.  These false affirmations were material in each previous Courts decisions regarding Ms. Ausley’s efforts to obtain Mrs. Sauter’s specimens, ownership of which Raymond J. Sauter fought tooth and nail.  Since these complaints were not discussed at the January 11, 2011, probable cause hearing they cannot be dismissed.

 

 

Page 22:

            Andrew Falzon, M.D. (followed Natarajan as Medical Examiner)

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The three Complaints against Dr. Falzon were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Dr. Andrew Falzon.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof. 

Lines 4-11:  Strouse filed three complaints against Dr. Falzon contained in Summons No: 1219-S-2010-000314, according to the Court.  The three complaints as listed by the Court are accurate.

Lines 12-17:  It is not clear which complaint the Court is addressing, as Strouse filed three against Dr. Falzon.  It is a matter of public record that DiCarlo falsified an official document, Mrs. Sauter’s Certificate of Death (attachments 17, 21, and 22), which was available to the Court at the time of the hearing, but the Court refused to enter it into evidence.  When Ms. Ausley requested to correct the certificate of death (attachment 30), based on the various examinations and admissions to date, Dr. Falzon parroted Mr. Aronowitz’s prior response (attachment 13 and 30) as noted in the Opinion.  Falzon’s response was already proven false; see the evidence supporting the complaints against Aronowtiz, DiCarlo, Natarajan and Falzon for the details, that the Court refused to enter into evidence.  Note that evidence that would have supported Strouse’s statements was not accepted by the Court at the probable cause hearing, citing that for some reason unknown to Strouse, this was not an “evidentiary probable cause hearing.”  In responding that there was no basis upon which to make any changes, Falzon, knowing that continued legal action was ongoing, knowingly and purposely took the party line to benefit and protect Sauter and the other public servants from investigation for Mrs. Sauter’s murder, and the subsequent cover up.  Since these complaints were not discussed at the probable cause hearing they cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 22:

            Denise Hollingsworth, Esq. (OAG, Dep. Attorney General)

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The five complaints against Ms. Hollingsworth were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Denise M. Hollingsworth.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.  Strouse filed five complaints against Hollingsworth.

 

Page 23:

            Lines 6-13:  Evidence to support the criminal complaints filed against DAG Hollingsworth, like the criminal complaints filed against the other 14 persons, was available for the Court to review on the day of the hearing, however, the Court refused to accept the evidence, stating that this was a “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing”, in accordance with Rules of the Court cited, but not found, by the Court..  Ms. Hollingsworth’s knowing and purposeful efforts to protect all personnel against whom complaints were filed was successful, at the cost of violating duties and responsibilities inherent in the nature of her position in the Attorney Generals Office. 

Over 600 pages of evidence was reviewed by Hollingsworth, according to her letter of June 9, 2008.  For example, despite having a copy of the falsified certificate of death from Dr. DiCarlo, Hollingsworth concluded the certificate of death was not falsified (attachments 17 and 21); despite having written statements from Dr. DiCarlo indicating he did not conduct an autopsy (attachments 21 and 22), she saw nothing wrong with Aronowitz falsely swearing in Superior Court that DiCarlo had indeed conducted an autopsy on Mrs. Sauter (attachment 23); despite reading in the Sayreville Police Supplemental Investigation Reports and the Medical Examiner External Examination Report that a suspicious death had been reported and was being investigated by authorities (attachments 7 and 8), she found no merit in the fact that Aronowtiz falsely reported that a suspicious death had not been reported in Superior Court, Middlesex County (attachment 13).  Though Hollingsworth knew that the Medical Examiner told the Middlesex County Prosecutor to conduct the necessary suspicious death investigation (attachment 8), Hollingsworth found no problem with the Prosecutor’s Office waiting over 80 days (attachment 16), before making a decision not to investigate.  See all the complaints against the other 14 persons involved in this suspicious death case. Since this complaint was not discussed at the probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011, it cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 23:

            Anne Milgram, Attorney General State of New Jersey

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The two complaints against Ms. Milgram were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints against Milgram were ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Ms. Milgram.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof. 

Page 24:

            Lines 1-12:  Ms. Milgram had a duty and responsibility inherent in her office to ensure that Deputy Attorney Generals working for her properly carried out their own duties and responsibilities.  She failed with DAG Denise Hollingsworth, as Hollingsworth knowingly and purposely failed to properly investigate criminal allegations against 15 persons in Middlesex County.  Evidence to support Strouse’s statements was refused to be entered into the record by Judge Lawson, who stated that this was a non-evidentiary probable cause hearing.  As a result of Milgram’s failure to provide adequate supervision, Milgram hindered the apprehension or prosecution of another, specifically Sauter and the other 14 persons charged by Strouse.  Evidence to support this charge was refused entry into the record by Judge Lawson.  Since these complaints were not heard on January 11, 2011, they cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 24:

II.        APPLICABLE LAW (Strouse’s comments to the Court’s Opinion)

A.    Probable Cause Determination

In this opinion, the Court cited Rule 3:3-1 (a)(d) and 3:3-2 as being applicable.

The Court cited  R. 3:3-2 (attachment 39) as being the source for stating that such as thing as a “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing” existed.  Rule 3:3-2 was deleted effective January 1, 1995.  Such statement is totally false and calls into question the Court’s knowledge of criminal law and its basis for conducting  what it stated was a “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing.” (see the Transcript or listen to the 2-disk CD).  In fact, there is nothing in the Rules of the Court regarding conducting a non-evidentiary probable cause hearing. 

Such a false statement by the Court is a violation of due process and clearly brings into question the Court’s intent for the planned outcome of the hearing.  The purpose of a probable cause hearing is to permit a citizen, in this case, to present a complaint along with the evidence to support that complaint, which may or may not lead to an arrest and subsequent trial.  Contrary to what previous Courts told Strouse, Judge Lawson advised Strouse at the beginning of the hearing on January 11, 2011, that  his supporting documentation and evidence was required to be attached to each complaint at the time the complaints were signed (June 2, 2010), and as a result, the Court would not permit Strouse to enter or use his evidence in the hearing.  Also, there is nothing stated in the Rule cited by the Court that evidence in support of the complaint must be attached to the Citizens Complaint documents at the time of initial filing of the complaint.  Also, decisions regarding the determination of probable cause are based on less strict interpretations of the law, often referred to as the reasonable person test.  Judge Lawson misses the point when he holds Strouse to, first, no evidence permitted, and second, engaging in a legal debate on the merits of the written complaint alone. 

 

B.     Complaints Against Public Officials

Page 25:

 

Lines 8-13: The Court makes a broad generalization that “Almost all of the

Complaints against the public officials listed above stem from the allegedly illegal suspicious death investigation conducted by Dr. DiCarlo and alleged cover up that followed.”  This is blatantly false.  Sauter murdered Mrs. Strouse through starvation and dehydration and overmedication, and possibly suffocation.  Without Raymond J. Sauter murdering Mrs. Sauter, DiCarlo would not have been in the picture.  DiCarlo is but one of 15 persons who are actively involved benefiting Sauter by protecting him from investigation for the suspicious death of Mrs. Sauter. The Court cannot “address those complaints together.” except as part of the murder investigation of Sauter (pending).  Regardless of the status of the murder investigation, each of the other 14 persons committed crimes separate and distinct and can be prosecuted separately; though they are inter-related, they are not/not inter-dependent, as the Court is falsely portraying.  Dr. DiCarlo’s criminal actions are separate and distinct from any criminal actions taken by any of the other persons against whom criminal complaints were filed.  Further, each complaint filed against Dr. DiCarlo stands alone, as if no other complaints were filed against him.  The Court could find probable cause for one and dismiss another.  The criminal complaints exist on their own merit.  In other words, the Court is in error to dismiss criminal complaints against all others should it find no probable cause against DiCarlo, for one or more complaints. Likewise, if no probable cause is found against any one of the others, that is no reason to dismiss a finding of probable cause against the remainder of defendants.  The complaints are all criminal, being properly cited under 2C; none are civil.  The facts remain that a variety of criminal laws under 2C were broken.  The Court’s logic is severely flawed and needs to be addressed at a higher level.  For the sake of argument, Strouse will address the Courts rationalizations as follows.

            Lines 14-24: The Court cites select passages from the New Jersey State Medical Examiner Act 52:17B-78 et seq. in support of its position and intended outcome.  The Court’s citation of N.J.S.A. 52:17B-86(b) is unnecessary because a suspicious death was reported to and by the Sayreville Police Department and the Middlesex County Medical Examiners Office.  Therefore, the paragraph that applies is 52:17B-86 (c).  It is under paragraph (c) that the investigation is conducted in this case. N.J.S.A 52:17B-87, Notification of county medical examiner and prosecutor, requires that the county medical examiner and county prosecutor be immediately notified. 

N.J.S.A 52:17B-88 notes that if the cause of death is established beyond a reasonable doubt, the medical examiner reduces his findings to writing and prepares a full report that is submitted to the State Medical Examiner.  Of note here is that in the case of a suspicious death, the cause of death is not established beyond a reasonable doubt.  When the cause of death is not established beyond a reasonable doubt, an autopsy is the only way in which the true cause and manner of death can be determined.

In addition to what the Court cites on page 25 of the Opinion, regarding a suspicious death report, the Court fails to mention that the same paragraph (52:17B-87) also states:

 “… it shall be the duty of the physician in attendance, any law

enforcement officer having knowledge of such death, the funeral

director, or any other person present, to notify immediately the

county medical examiner and the county prosecutor ….” (emphasis added) 

 

Further, the Act, in 52:17B-90 Cooperation in investigation and autopsy, states:

 

 (a) All law enforcement officers, county prosecutors and other

officials shall co-operate fully with the office of the State Medical

Examiner and the county medical examiners in making the

investigations and conducting the autopsies herein provided. 

Such officials and all physicians, funeral directors, embalmers

and other persons shall assist in making dead bodies and

related evidence available to such medical examiners for

investigations and autopsies. (emphasis added)

 

Additionally, NJAC 13L49-5.1 Death Investigations cites the following:

(c) The duty medical examiner shall take complete charge of every body

whose death is reported to the office, and shall not release it to the next

of kin or authorized representative for burial or cremation until

sufficient information has been accumulated, proper specimens and

evidence have been collected as needed, and appropriate examinations

have been conducted to establish the cause and manner of death and

the identity of the decedent.”

 

AND

 

            (e) iv. Recovery of physical evidence from the scene of suspected

criminal homicides shall be the responsibility of the prosecutor.

 

(f).3. In criminal homicide investigations, witnesses and potential

suspects shall be interviewed by law enforcement personnel,

and the medical examiner shall coordinate with the prosecutor

to obtain information that is required as part of the medical death

investigation.

 

(i)The responsibility of the medical examiner to investigate the

medical cause of death as set forth in this subchapter shall also

oblige him to cooperate and coordinate with the county prosecutor

in the conduct of a criminal investigation.     

 

As previously stated, Dr. DiCarlo, when learning of the suspicious death report from Lt. Brennan and Det Sprague, directed both the Sayreville Police Department and the Middlesex County Prosecutors Office to conduct the necessary suspicious death investigation (attachments 8 and 7).  Kaplan and Lamb of the Middlesex County Prosecutors Office knowingly and purposely chose not to conduct the mandatory suspicious death investigation so as to benefit and protect Sauter from being investigated for Mrs. Sauter’s suspicious death.

 

Page 26

            Lines 4-15: The Court acknowledges that the medical examiner must conduct an autopsy of the decedent’s body in cases of suspicious death.  Since the Court agrees that a suspicious death was properly reported regarding the suspicious death of Mrs. Strouse, the Court acknowledges that a suspicious death investigation should have occurred which included an autopsy.  As the Court already knows, an autopsy was not conducted by Dr. DiCarlo (attachments 8 and 21), though at one point he falsely certified that he did conduct an autopsy (attachment 17).  Why would DiCarlo certify on one occasion that he did not conduct an autopsy and then on another occasion, certify that he did conduct an autopsy on Mrs. Sauter (attachments 17 and 21 and 22)?  The Court, however, has outdone itself regarding the definition of autopsy.  The 2-disk CD audio of the probable cause hearing shows that the court knowingly and purposely insisted on using a definition of autopsy not found in law.  The Court first used a definition from Funk and Wagnalls Dictionary that defined autopsy as a post mortem examination of the human body and the taking of specimens. Then the court shifted to Black’s Dictionary to define autopsy, which was basically to determine the cause and nature of disease. Strouse pointed out to the Court that New Jersey Administrative Code, Title 13. Law and Public Safety Chapter 49. State Medical Examiner Subchapter 1. Autopsies, provides the definition in paragraph (d), which reads:

            (d) “…, the autopsy standard for apparent homicides, suspicious

deaths, and deaths with no visible anatomic cause shall include

a complete inspection, removal and dissection of the cranial

compartment and contents, the neck viscera and tongue, and any

additional dissections which may be indicated by the circumstances

of death; and shall include the collection and preservation of

body tissues for toxicological and microscopic examination

and any additional examinations which may be required

by the nature of the circumstances.” (emphasis added)

 

The reason Judge Lawson did not want to use the definition found in N.J.A.C. 13:49 for the acceptable definition of autopsy is because it did not support his intended outcome of benefiting and protecting Sauter and DiCarlo, Natarajan, Falzon, and all the rest. Note that the law uses the word “standard”.  “Standard” for suspicious death autopsies includes a complete removal, and dissection of the cranial compartment and contents, the neck viscera and tongue, and any additional dissections which may be indicated, among others.  Clearly this is an invasive process and not just the mere removal of several specimens, as performed by Dr. DiCarlo.  The standard proscribes the least intrusive procedure of any autopsy.  The Court again selects its citations to support its intended outcome, which is the dismissal of all complaints.

 

Page 26:

            i.  Frederick J. DiCarlo, M.D., Assistant Medical Examiner, Middlesex County

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The 10 complaints against Dr. DiCarlo were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints against DiCarlo were ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Dr. DiCarlo.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.  (attachment 32)

            Lines 16-24: Judge Lawson refers to the “alleged suspicious death” of Mrs. Sauter.  As shown in the Sayreville Police Department Supplemental Investigation Report (attachment 7), and Dr. DiCarlo’s External Examination Report dated January 27, 2006 (attachment 8), the death of Mrs. Sauter was deemed suspicious by both law enforcement and the Medical Examiners Office. The Court falsely implies that Strouse delayed the reporting of a suspicious death to the Sayreville Police Department on October 29, 2005, when in fact, Raymond J. Sauter waited 1 hour and 22 minutes after Mrs. Sauter’s death before he decided to call the police—sufficient time for Sauter to ensure that Mrs. Sauter was dead.  Further, Deby Bath waited almost three hours before she notified Strouse that his sister was dead. When asked by Strouse why Bath waited so long, she had no explanation. 

 

Page (26)-27

Lines (24) and 1-9: If the Court is unwilling to accept as true any statements made by Strouse, how is it that the Court can possibly state with confidence that “Dr. DiCarlo conducted an external examination of Mrs. Sauter’s body and took blood, urine, liver, and vitreous samples?  Where did Judge Lawson obtain this information from?  How does Judge Lawson know that four specimens were sent to the State Tox Lab on November 1, 2005, and that Dr. DiCarlo requested only two of the four be analyzed?  And how does Judge Lawson know that the two specimens Dr. DiCarlo did not request to be analyzed were the two specimens (liver and vitreous) that could have exonerated or convicted Sauter of murder?  The Court knows the significance of destroying evidence before the investigation is complete, yet does not address that particular issue herein.  Why is that?  The results of the analysis of Mrs. Sauter’s specimens were received on November 29, 2005 (attachment 19).  Those results only report on the “contents” of the blood and urine and say absolutely nothing about cancer.  Dr. DiCarlo failed to interview the two most important witnesses, Strouse and Ausley, who made the accusations that initiated the suspicious death investigation.  Why would Dr. DiCarlo not interview either Strouse or Ausley?  Why does the Court ignore that significant fact in its Opinion?  The Court ignores that so as to continue to provide a benefit to Sauter and all the other persons named in the 61 criminal complaints.  Contrary to what the Court writes, Dr. DiCarlo finalized his report on January 27, 2006 (not on January 19, 2005), when he falsified Mrs. Sauter’s Certificate of Death (attachment 8) The Court knows that since an autopsy was not conducted, it is not possible to determine the cause and manner of death, in a suspicious death case, beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Court knowingly and purposely chooses to ignore that fact. 

 

 

Page 27:

            Lines 10-24: Once again to help support his slanted, biased, and prejudiced outcome, Judge Lawson does not provide the full detail of the facts he has somehow come up with.  For example, Judge Lawson notes only that “she had six (6) months or less to live, ….”.  However, the full statement from Mrs. Sauter’s doctor, Elias Lehaf, M.D., strictly for Hospice purposes (to get into Hospice you have to be certified you have 6 months or less to live), was the following:  “Based on my clinical expertise and in consultation with the Central New Jersey hospice Interdisciplinary Team, I certify that the above named patient has a terminal illness with a prognosis of six months or less if the illness runs its course.” (attachment 8; emphasis added)  That is only if the illness runs its course.  That means that Mrs. Sauter could have lived 4 months, 8 months or maybe 2 years or more, if Sauter had not hastened her death by reneging on his responsibility as sole caretaker and starved, dehydrated, and overmedicated Mrs. Sauter to death.  In January 2005, Joyce had previously been given 8 months to live.  Judge Lawson tries, and fails, to draw a correlation between Dr. Lehaf’s statement and an autopsy that was not conducted by Dr. DiCarlo.  Judge Lawson also fails to link his concept of the term “least intrusive” to support the taking of four specimens from Mrs. Sauter, when as demonstrated previously, the N.J.A.C. makes it clear that the minimum standard for conducting the least intrusive autopsy involves,

 

a complete inspection, removal and dissection of the cranial

compartment and contents, the neck viscera and tongue, and

any additional dissections which may be indicated by the

circumstances of death   (emphasis added)

 

The External Examination conducted by Dr. DiCarlo does not meet the standard of an autopsy and is in fact “Certified” by DiCarlo as an External Examination (attachment 8).  Likewise, Dr. DiCarlo, certified that all he conducted was an External Examination, and did not certify that he conducted an autopsy.  Thus, despite Judge Lawson’s contention, Dr. DiCarlo did not in fact meet the minimum autopsy standard and did not conduct an autopsy.  Further, in his own words, Dr. DiCarlo documented in a letter dated December 27, 2007 (attachments 22), to Carolyn Ausley, that he did not conduct an autopsy, stating: “The postmortem examination of Joyce B. Sauter consisted of an external examination and toxicology testing in conjunction with review of the medical records and investigative reports.”  In his own words, DiCarlo acknowledges he did not conduct an autopsy and acknowledges he violated the law.  This is the same Court that initially refused to accept the State’s definition of autopsy (N.J.A.C. 13:49) and instead turned to Funk and Wagnalls Dictionary, and Black’s Dictionary for a definition that would meet the Court’s intended outcome.  How obvious can the Court be? The Court knowingly and purposely misleads all reading this Opinion by clearly demonstrating a significant bias against Strouse and compromising what could have been a fair and impartial hearing.  While Mrs. Sauter’s medical records showed a history of cancer, something not contested by Strouse, nothing Dr. DiCarlo did in terms of his investigation confirmed Mrs. Sauter’s condition.  Nothing.  The evidence the Court refused to accept from Strouse shows that decisively, yet the Court seeks to use its power and authority to bully its way to its intended outcome, which is to provide a benefit for Sauter and all the others, the benefit of no probable cause and no investigation.  Judge Lawson is successful.

            Since Dr. DiCarlo failed to conduct the mandatory autopsy in accordance with the law, the report he issued regarding cause and manner of death on January 27, 2006 is false, and resulted in his certifying a false certificate of death, as noted previously.  The Court further notes that “The only possible action or omission by Dr. DiCarlo that rendered his investigation non-compliant with the Act was the delay in obtaining possession of the body.” While the Court admits to one law violation for DiCarlo, this is a mostly false statement on the part of the Court because of the numerous, documented law violations.  This Court should be held accountable for its continued innuendos and false and misleading statements.  The specific listing of criminal violations committed by Dr. DiCarlo are contained in the criminal complaint evidence that the Court refused Strouse to use at the probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011. 

For example, DiCarlo falsified a Certificate of Death; DiCarlo Falsely swore in Superior Court Middlesex County that he conducted an autopsy; DiCarlo falsely certified that he did not conduct an autopsy; DiCarlo provided false information to law enforcement authorities; DiCarlo tampered with public records or information by making false entries and making or presenting false documents; DiCarlo, by his own conduct and in conspiracy with Sauter and others, hindered the apprehension or prosecution of Sauter and others; DiCarlo is guilty of official misconduct as he failed to conduct proper forensic practice even though it was inherent in his duties and responsibilities to do so; as a result of all of his violations, proven in the evidence  Judge Lawson refused Strouse to use, DiCarlo is also guilty of pattern of official misconduct.  These are all criminal complaints under 2C The New Jersey Code of Criminal Conduct.  Not one of these complaints is Civil, as the Court would have you believe.

What the Court is making out to be a delay in reporting a suspicious death was caused by the fact that Bath and Sauter waited almost three hours after Mrs. Sauter’s death to notify Strouse of his sister’s demise.  If anyone delayed in reporting Mrs. Sauter’s death, it was Mr. Sauter, who waited one hour and twenty-two minutes before calling the police.

Lines 18-24:  Strouse is confused.  Why is the Court defending DiCarlo, on the one hand, and suggesting limitations for civil claims on the other, by suggesting that “The only possible action or omission by Dr. DiCarlo that rendered his investigation non-compliant with the Act was the delay in obtaining possession of the body”  It is interesting that the Court is suggesting to Strouse that he may have civil claims against DiCarlo for delay in securing Mrs. Sauter’s body.  What is going on with this Court?

Had the Court accepted Strouse’s evidence, as it was compelled to do, the Court would have been convinced of the truthfulness of Strouse’s complaints. Since the complaints against DiCarlo were not discussed at the probable cause hearing, they cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 28:

ii.  Geetha Ann Natarajan, M.D., Medical Examiner (DiCarlo’s supervisor)

The Court refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The two complaints against Dr. Natarajan were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints against Natarajan were ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Dr. Natarajan.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof. 

            Lines 4-12: Contrary to what the Court states, the complaints against Dr. Natarajan arise from her own conduct in failing to carry out duties and responsibilities  inherent in her job as Medical Examiner and Dr. DiCarlo’s supervisor, or from omission to do the same.  Her complaints stand alone and though they may be inter-related to all other complaints, they are not inter-dependent, as the Court would have one believe.  The two criminal complaints, Official Misconduct (2C:30-2 (a)(b)) and Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution of Another (2C:29-3 (a) (3)(5) stand alone in their criminal violations.  As noted above, based on the N.J.A.C. Title 13, Chapter 49, and the State Medical Examiner Act 52-17B-86 et al, and the criminal complaints filed against Dr. DiCarlo available to the Court but refused by the Court at the Probable Cause hearing, Dr. DiCarlo’s investigation was not/not conducted in compliance with either.  As a result, the separate and distinct criminal charges against Dr. Natarajan must stand. (attachment 32). Since the complaints against Dr. Natarajan were not discussed at the probable cause hearing they cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 28:

            ii. Andrew Falzon, M.D., Medical Examiner Post Natarajan, Middlesex County

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The three complaints against Dr. Falzon were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints against Falzon were ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Dr. Falzon.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof. 

Lines 4-12: Contrary to what the Court states, the complaints against Dr. Falzon arise from his own conduct in failing to carry out duties and responsibilities  inherent in his job as Medical Examiner and Dr. DiCarlo’s supervisor, or from omission to do the same.  The three criminal complaints, (1) Official Misconduct (2C:30-2 (a)(b)); (2) Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution of Another (2C:29-3 (a) (3)(5); and (3) False Swearing 2C:28-2(a), stand alone in their criminal violations.  As noted above, based on the N.J.A.C. Title 13, Chapter 49, and the State Medical Examiner Act 52-17B-86 et al, and the criminal complaints filed against Dr. DiCarlo available to the Court but refused by the Court at the Probable Cause hearing, Dr. DiCarlo’s investigation was not/not conducted in compliance with either.  As a result, the separate and distinct criminal charges against Dr. Falzon must stand. Since the complaints against Dr. Falzon were not discussed at the probable cause hearing they cannot be dismissed. (attachments 8, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 37)

 

Page 28:

            iii. (a) Jeffrey Sprague, Detective, Sayreville Municipal Court, Middlesex County

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The three complaints against Det Sprague were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints against Sprague were ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Sprague.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.  (attachment 35)

Lines 13-25: As noted previously, the 2C criminal complaints/charges against Det Sprague stand alone.  Regardless of the outcome of other complaints, or the basis upon which the complaints are made, Sprague, by his own conduct, chose to act in violation of Department policy and the laws of the State of New Jersey.  For the Court to dismiss these charges based on the dismissal of one other charge is unheard of, biased, and prejudicial.  Conspiracy is only one of the three charges against Det Sprague.  It was clearly Sprague’s intent, by his own conduct, to provide a benefit for Sauter, to wit, no investigation, and he was successful.  Again, as detailed above, the basis for the Courts opinion herein is bogus, that is, the alleged failure of one complaint does not result in failure of all the other complaints.  Additionally, it must be noted that Dr. DiCarlo’s complaints were not discussed, per se, at the probable cause hearing.  The only complaint discussed at the probable cause hearing was the charge of murder against Raymond J. Sauter, and again, the Court refused to let Strouse present any evidence in support of his charges.  As a reminder, Dr. DiCarlo’s suspicious death investigation was not conducted in compliance with the “Act”, a false statement from Judge Lawson.  Therefore, contrary to the false conclusion by the Court, the charges against Sprague must stand. 

 

Page 29:

Lines 1-9: Significant deficiencies in the conduct of Sprague’s investigation occurred.  According to Sprague’s own Supplemental Investigation Report of 10-29-2005, he did not conduct a crime scene investigation and did not recover any evidence; neither did Kaplan nor Lamb of the Prosecutor’s Office, though each was directed by DiCarlo to conduct the necessary suspicious death investigation (attachment 8).  Over the course of the investigation, Sprague failed to conduct necessary interviews with appropriate parties having information pertinent to the investigation, such as Sauter, Ausley, Strouse, Candice Boehler-Marquette’s therapist, and so on.  Instead of Mirandizing Sauter, the accused murderer and a former police officer, Sprague and Noble Mirandized Mrs. Sauter’s daughter, Deby Bath, identifying her as the accused or suspect of Mrs. Sauter’s suspicious death (attachment 28).  Had Judge Lawson permitted Strouse to enter his evidence into the hearing, the Court would have learned how incompetently the investigation was conducted by law enforcement (attachments 35 and 36).  In fact, at one time in the effort to obtain Mrs. Sauter’s four specimens for independent lab testing, Judge Travis L. Francis opined (attachment 10):

 

Now, it’s interesting that Ms. Ausley’s application is also supported

by a certification from — from the decedent’s brother, and it’s also

interesting that the — that law enforcement has consistently failed

to take any action, notwithstanding the allegations of — of the — of

the plaintiff in this matter.

 

What factual basis does the Judge Lawson have for making statements?  While the Court appears to be using information taken from Strouse’s complaints favorable to the defendants, the Court, like Sprague and all others against whom charges are filed, discounts the very same comments when used by Strouse.   Judge Lawson notes that Det Sprague and Det Noble interviewed Bath, Sauter, and Boehler-Marquette.  Without letting Strouse present his evidence, how does the Court know this to be true?  That aside, what Sprague and Noble did was to merely punch a ticket, to say they conducted interviews with appropriate personnel.  What the Court did not see, because it refused to permit Strouse to use his evidence in support of his complaints, was the failure of the interviews to obtain information pertinent to a suspicious death investigation that directly addressed the allegations made by Strouse and Ausley.  Surely the Court must wonder why Sprague and Noble Mirandized Bath when the report indicates it was Sauter who was accused of murdering Mrs. Sauter. 

The mis-carriage of justice continues.  The Court falsely concludes that following Dr. DiCarlo’s final report (which is dated January 27, 2006), which the Court says declared the cause of death to be cancer, the death was no longer suspicious.  The Court’s statement is false and is intended to support its intended outcome, which is to exonerate all 15 persons charged in Strouse’s complaints.  The Court’s statement is false because according the New Jersey Administrative Code, Title 13, Chapter 49, and the State Medical Examiner Act 52-17B-78 et al, the only way to determine the true cause and manner of death in a suspicious death case is to conduct an autopsy.  Documentation available to the  Court, which the Court refused to enter into evidence, shows that no autopsy was conducted on Mrs. Sauter (attachments 21, 22, 32, and 33) this to be true, as previously discussed.  Further, with the findings of the independent forensic pathologist, Dr. Michael Berkland, D.O., Mrs. Sauter was in a prolonged fasting and starvation condition, and was dehydrated, at the time of her death (attachment 20).  How Mrs. Sauter got into that condition is the subject of these complaints. Though Judge Lawson spent a good portion of the “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing” on the charge of murder against Raymond J. Sauter, and seeking a ”motive” which is not necessary to prove according to the State law, very little of that is discussed by the Court herein, leading one to conclude missteps on the part of the Court, and questioning the Court’s ability to provide a fair and impartial hearing.

 

Page 29:

Lines 10-20: Judge Lawson defends Sprague’s knowing and purposeful decision not to conduct a crime scene investigation when he returned to the Sauter house on October 29, 2005, to obtain from Sauter the location of Mrs. Sauter’s body.  The crime that failure to preserve the crime scene: “however, even if they failed to adequately preserve the scene and evidence, such an omission certainly does not rise to a crime.”  There was no/no preservation of the crime scene, nothing close to “failed to adequately preserve….” This omission supports official misconduct.  Sprague, Noble, Brennan and Garbowski had a duty and responsibility inherent in their positions with law enforcement to conduct a crime scene investigation, especially knowing that they were now investigating a suspicious death, allegedly caused by a former Dunellen police officer.  Either by omission, or knowing and purposely, the abdicated their sworn responsibility.  Under 2C:30-2, this is a criminal offense, not civil.  The crime is hindering apprehension or prosecution of another.  By not conducting the standard protocol crime scene investigation, among others, their actions hindered the apprehension and subsequent prosecution and conviction of Sauter and others, surrounding the crime against Mrs. Sauter that was never/never investigated. The crime is conspiracy.  Sauter, a former police officer, is likely to have known the individuals involved in this investigation and called upon protection from the “blue wall”, which only citizens seem to know exists.

The Court refused to permit Strouse to present his evidence, city a Court Rule that supported a “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing.”  No such Rule could be found as cited.  Had Judge Lawson permitted Strouse to present his evidence, Strouse would have demonstrated how the conspiracy unfolded, on a complaint by complaint basis. All of these complaints are criminal, not civil. 

Judge Lawson’s continued defense of the defendants is disturbing and totally incongruent with the intent of a fair and impartial probable cause hearing.  Judge Lawson makes it clear that he is not merely seeking clarification of information, nor is he seeking the truth, rather, it is clear that his efforts are oriented to defending the defendants so as to be able to discount everything Strouse says, and render a finding of no probable cause.  While the Court states it is “unaware of the steps taken by the detectives upon their initial arrival at the Sauter house to secure the scene,” had the Court permitted Strouse to present the Supplemental Investigation Report dated 10/29/2005, the Court would have clearly seen that no crime scene investigation was conducted by the Sayreville Police Department, (or the Medical Examiners Office, or the Prosecutors Office), and Det Sprague in particular.  The Court needs to review the complaints against Sprague, Noble, Brennan, Garbowski, and all the others, so as to make a fair and impartial ruling in these matters.  Judge Lawson raises, for some strange reason, tort liability, which is not part and parcel to any charges by Strouse.  Judge Lawson offers such a comment to distract, as we know the Court is not permitted to offer legal advice to Strouse.  Since complaints against Sprague were not discussed, per se, at the probable cause hearing, the cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 28:

            iii. (b) Detective Amy Noble, Sayreville Police Department, Middlesex County

Page 28:

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The three complaints against Det Noble were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints against Noble were ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Noble.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.  (attachment 35)

Lines 13-25: As noted previously, the 2C criminal complaints/charges against Det Noble stand alone.  Regardless of the outcome of other complaints, or the basis upon which the complaints are made, Noble, by her own conduct, chose to act in violation of Department policy and the laws of the State of New Jersey; her actions and omissions are material.  For the Court to dismiss these charges based on the dismissal of one other charge is unheard of, biased, and prejudicial.  Conspiracy is only one of the three charges against Det Noble.  It was clearly Noble’s intent, by her own conduct, to provide a benefit for Sauter, to wit, no investigation, and she was successful.  Again, as detailed above, the basis for the Courts opinion herein is bogus, that is, the alleged failure of one complaint does not result in failure of all the other complaints.  While the complaints may be inter-related they are not inter-dependent.  Additionally, it must be noted that complaints against Det Noble were not discussed at the probable cause hearing.  The only complaint discussed at the probable cause hearing was the charge of murder against Raymond J. Sauter, and again, the Court refused Strouse to present any evidence in support of his charges.  As a reminder, Dr. DiCarlo’s suspicious death investigation was not conducted in compliance with the “Act”, a false statement from Judge Lawson.  Therefore, contrary to the false conclusion by the Court, the charges against Noble must stand.  Since complaints against Det Noble were not discussed at the probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011, they cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 29:

Lines 1-9: Significant deficiencies in the conduct of Noble’s and Sprague’s investigation occurred.  According to Sprague’s own Supplemental Investigation Report of 10-29-2005, he did not conduct a crime scene investigation and did not recover any evidence; neither did Kaplan nor Lamb of the Prosecutor’s Office, though each was directed by DiCarlo to conduct the necessary suspicious death investigation.  Noble was aware of these discrepancies and violations and did nothing.

Over the course of the investigation, Noble failed to conduct necessary interviews with appropriate parties having information pertinent to the investigation, such as Sauter, Ausley, Strouse, and Candice Boehler-Marquette’s therapist, and “Augustina”, Mrs. Sauter’s primary hospice nurse.  Instead of Mirandizing Sauter, the accused murderer and a former police officer, Sprague and Noble Mirandized Mrs. Sauter’s daughter, Deby Bath, identifying her as the accused or suspect of Mrs. Sauter’s suspicious death (attachment 28).  Had Judge Lawson permitted Strouse to enter his evidence into the hearing, the Court would have learned how incompetently the investigation was conducted by law enforcement (attachment 35).  In fact, at one time in the effort to obtain Mrs. Sauter’s four specimens for independent lab testing, Judge Travis L. Francis opined (attachment 10):

Now, it’s interesting that Ms. Ausley’s application is also supported

by a certification from — from the decedent’s brother, and it’s also

interesting that the — that law enforcement has consistently failed

to take any action, notwithstanding the allegations of — of the — of

the plaintiff in this matter.

 

These allegations referenced by Judge Francis were murder, neglect, and others.  See the complaints against Sauter et al.  What factual basis does the Judge Lawson have for making statements?  While the Court appears to be using information taken from Strouse’s complaints favorable to the defendants, like Noble and all others against whom charges are filed, the Court then discounts the very same comments when used by Strouse.   Judge Lawson notes that Det Sprague and Det Noble interviewed Bath, Sauter, and Boehler-Marquette.  Without letting Strouse present his evidence, how does the Court know this to be true?  That aside, what Sprague and Noble did was to merely punch a ticket, to say they conducted interviews with appropriate personnel.  What the Court did not see, because it refused to permit Strouse to use his evidence in support of his complaints, was the failure of the interviews to obtain information pertinent to a suspicious death investigation that directly addressed the allegations made by Strouse and Ausley.  Surely the Court must wonder why Sprague and Noble Mirandized Bath when the report indicates it was Sauter who was accused of murdering Mrs. Sauter.  The mis-carriage of justice continues. 

The Court falsely concludes that following Dr. DiCarlo’s final report (which is dated January 27, 2006), which the Court says declared the cause of death to be cancer, the death was no longer suspicious.  The Court’s statement is false and is intended to support its intended outcome, which is to exonerate all 15 persons charged in Strouse’s complaints.  The Court’s statement is false because according the New Jersey Administrative Code, Title 13, Chapter 49, and the State Medical Examiner Act 52-17B-78 et al, the only way to determine the true cause and manner of death in a suspicious death case is to conduct and autopsy.  Documentation available to the  Court, which the Court prohibited Strouse from entering into evidence, shows this to be true, as previously discussed.  Further, with the findings of the independent forensic pathologist, Dr. Michael Berkland, D.O. (attachment 20), Mrs. Sauter was in a prolonged fasting and starvation condition, and was dehydrated, at the time of her death.  How Mrs. Sauter got into that condition is the subject of these complaints. Though Judge Lawson spent a good portion of the “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing” on the charge of murder against Raymond J. Sauter, and the seeking of motive—very little of that is discussed by the Court herein, leading one to conclude missteps on the part of the Court, and questioning the Court’s ability to provide a fair and impartial hearing.  As the Court knew, I am sure, it is not necessary to prove motive in a murder case.  If the Court knew that, why did the Court spend so much time pressing Strouse for Sauter’s motive in murdering Mrs. Sauter?

 

Page 29:

            Lines 10-20: Judge Lawson defends Sprague’s knowing and purposeful decision not to conduct a crime scene investigation when he returned to the Sauter house on October 29, 2005, to obtain from Sauter the location of Mrs. Sauter’s body.  The crime that failure to: “however, even if they failed to adequately preserve the scene and evidence, such an omission certainly does not rise to a crime.”  supports official misconduct.  Sprague, Noble, Brennan and Garbowski had a duty and responsibility inherent in their positions as law enforcement officers to conduct a crime scene investigation, especially knowing that they were now investigating a suspicious death caused by a former police officer.  Either by omission, or knowing and purposely, they abdicated their sworn duties and responsibility.  Under 2C:30-2, this is a criminal offense, not civil.  The crime is hindering apprehension or prosecution of another.  By not conducting the standard protocol crime scene investigation, among others, their actions hindered the apprehension and subsequent prosecution and conviction of Sauter and others, surrounding the crime against Mrs. Sauter that was never/never investigated. The crime is conspiracy.  Sauter, a former police officer, is likely to have known the individuals involved in this investigation and called upon protection from the “blue wall”, which only citizens seem to know exists.  Had Judge Lawson permitted Strouse to present his evidence, Strouse would have demonstrated how the conspiracy unfolded, on a complaint by complaint basis. All of these complaints are criminal, not civil. 

Judge Lawson’s continued defense of the defendants is disturbing and totally incongruent with the intent of a fair and impartial probable cause hearing.  Judge Lawson makes it clear that he is not merely seeking clarification of information, nor is he seeking the truth, rather, it is clear that his efforts are oriented to defending the defendants so as to be able to discount everything Strouse and Ausley say, and render a finding of no probable cause.  The Court states it is “unaware of the steps taken by the detectives upon their initial arrival at the Sauter house to secure the scene,”.  Had the Court permitted Strouse to present the Sayreville Police Supplemental Investigation Report dated 10/29/2005 (attachment 12), the Court would have clearly seen that no crime scene investigation was conducted by the Sayreville Police Department, (or the Medical Examiners Office, or the Prosecutors Office), and Det Sprague in particular.  The Court needs to review the complaints against Sprague, Noble, Brennan, Garbowski, and all the others, so as to make a fair and impartial ruling in these matters.  Judge Lawson raises, for some strange reason, tort liability, which is not part and parcel to any charges by Strouse.  Strouse is talking about knowing and purposeful  failure to investigate a crime scene and the Court tosses in a red herring regarding investigating information concerning unlawful or criminal activity.  Judge Lawson offers such a comment to distract, as we know the Court is not permitted to offer legal advice to Strouse.  Since this was not discussed at the probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011, it cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 28:

            iii. (c) Lt. Timothy Brennan, Sayreville Police Department, Middlesex County

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The one complaint against Lt. Brennan was not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints against Brennan were ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Brennan.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.  (attachment 35)

 

            Lines 16-25:  Lt. Brennan took the initial suspicious death report from Strouse and contacted the Medical Examiners Office (attachments 7 and 8), according to Det Sprague’s report.  According to the same report, Lt Brennan briefed Sprague on the suspicious death of Mrs. Sauter, and also talked with the Medical Examiners Office and then with Strouse.  The criminal charge against Lt. Brennan is Official Misconduct, and is supported  in the evidence that Judge Lawson refused Strouse to present at the non-evidentiary probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011.  Brennan knowingly and purposely did not provide proper supervision over an investigation he knew was sensitive, sensitive in the sense that Strouse informed Brennan that the alleged murderer was a former police officer with the Dunellen police department.  Strouse also informed Brennan and Sprague that Sauter had a gun safe in his basement. 

As discussed in Sprague and Noble, immediately above, the Court’s assertions are not founded on any facts supported by either the Court or Strouse, as Strouse was not permitted to enter his evidence for the Court’s benefit.  To reiterate, Dr. DiCarlo’s investigation was not compliant with N.J.A.C. 13.49 nor the State Medical Examiners Act.  Sprague and Noble knew this, so did Brennan and Garbowski, as their supervisory chain.  Noted is Judge Lawson’s false logic in stating that since the Court discounted Strouse’s statements regarding DiCarlo’s investigation—which was not discussed at the probable cause hearing, per se—that the “charges against the officers relating to their complicity in the actions of Dr. DiCarlo must fail.”  There is no truth to this statement by Judge Lawson.  While the complaints and charges may be inter-related, they are not inter-dependent. The logic of the court regarding these criminal charges is beyond reason.

 

Page 29:

Lines 1-9:  Had the Court accepted the direct and relevant evidence offered by Strouse to support his complaint, the Court would have learned that the crime scene was not secured, contrary to police investigative protocol.  Brennan and Garbowski had an inherent duty and responsibility to ensure that this investigation followed protocol because it involved a former police officer and so as to avoid accusations of favoritism.  Both Brennan and Garbowski failed, as noted in the complaints filed against them, Sprague, Noble, and all the others  (attachment 35).

The only reason the Court is unaware of the steps taken by the detectives, Brennan, and Garbowski, is because the Court refused to permit Strouse to present his evidence in support of his complaints.  Since this complaint was not discussed at the probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011, it cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 28:

iii.(d) Captain John Garbowski, Chief, Sayreville Police Department, Middlesex County

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The one complaint against Garbowski was not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaint against Garbowski was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Garbowski.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof (attachment 35).

            The Courts statement that “Much of Mr. Strouse’s charges against the Sayreville Police Officers …allege complicity in covering up Dr. DiCarlo’s illegal death investigation in order to protect Mr. Sauter.”  is only partially accurate.  Likewise, it is supported by Strouse’s evidence, which the Court refused to enter in the record.  Garbowski’s, Brennan’s, Noble’s, and Sprague’s charges stand alone and are not dependent upon “Dr. DiCarlo’s illegal suspicious death investigation….”  As proven earlier, DiCarlo’s investigation violated numerous N.J.A.C. and State Medical Examiner laws, including failure to conduct the mandatory suspicious death autopsy (attachment 21), and the following criminal charges: Conspiracy; Falsifying or Tampering with Records; False Swearing; False Swearing Inconsistent Statements; False Reports to Law Enforcement Authorities; Tampering with Public Records or Information (False Entry or Alteration); Tampering with Public Records or Information (Making, Presenting, Or Filing a False Document, Record, or Thing) Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution of Another; Official Misconduct; and Pattern of Official Misconduct.

  

Page 29:

Had the Court accepted the direct and relevant evidence offered by Strouse to support his complaint, the Court would have learned that the crime scene was not secured, contrary to police investigative protocol.  Brennan and Garbowski had an inherent duty and responsibility to ensure that this investigation, because it involved a former police officer, followed protocol so as to avoid accusations of favoritism.  Both Brennan and Garbowski failed, as noted in the complaints filed against them, Sprague, Noble, and all the others  (attachment 35). The only reason the Court is unaware of the steps taken by the detectives, Brennan, and Garbowski, is because the Court refused to permit Strouse to present his evidence in support of his complaints, wherein Sprague’s Supplemental Investigation Report (Suspicious Death) is silent on actions taken at the crime scene (attachment 12).

            Lt. Brennan took the initial suspicious death report from Strouse and contacted the Medical Examiners Office, according to Det Sprague’s report (attachment 7).  According to the same report, Lt Brennan briefed Sprague on the suspicious death of Mrs. Sauter, and also talked with the Medical Examiners Office and then with Strouse.  The criminal charge against Garbowski is Official Misconduct, and is supported  in the evidence that Judge Lawson refused Strouse to present at the non-evidentiary probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011.  Garbowski knowingly and purposely did not provide proper supervision—inherent in his position—over an investigation he knew was sensitive, sensitive in the sense that Strouse informed Brennan and Sprague that the alleged murderer was a former police officer with the Dunellen police department.  Strouse also informed Brennan and Sprague that Sauter had a gun safe in his basement.

As discussed in Sprague and Noble, immediately above, the Court’s assertions are not founded on any facts supported by either the Court or Strouse, as Strouse was not permitted to enter his evidence for the Court’s benefit.  To reiterate, Dr. DiCarlo’s investigation was not compliant with N.J.A.C. 13.49 nor the State Medical Examiners Act 52:17B-86 et al.  Sprague and Noble knew this, so did Brennan and Garbowski, as their supervisory chain.  Noted is Judge Lawson’s false logic in stating that since the Court discounted Strouse’s statements regarding DiCarlo’s investigation—which was not discussed at the probable cause hearing—that the “charges against the officers relating to their complicity in the actions of Dr. DiCarlo must fail.”  There is no truth to this statement by Judge Lawson. It is false logic and false law.  While the complaints may be inter-related they are  not inter-dependent.  Since the complaint was not discussed at the probable cause hearing it cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 29:

iv. Bruce Kaplan, Middlesex County Prosecutor, and William F. Lamb, 1st     Assistant Prosecutor, Middlesex County

The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The one complaint against Kaplan and the one complaint against Lamb was not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaint against Kaplan and Lamb was ignored by the Court (attachment 36).  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Kaplan and Lamb.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof  (attachment 36).

 

Page 29:

            Lines 21-25:  The allegations made by Strouse would have been proved had Judge Lawson permitted Strouse to present the evidence at the probable cause hearing on January 11. 2011.  The allegations stem from the fact that both Kaplan and Lamb had duties and responsibilities inherent in their jobs and knowingly and purposely decided not to exercise those duties and responsibilities with the outcome benefiting Sauter and all the others who have been charged (attachment 8, 15, and 16).

 

Page 30:

            Lines 1-4:  Falsely stated by Judge Lawson is that DiCarlo’s forensic practices were not improper.  The Court has absolutely no evidence to support such a statement. Evidence Judge Lawson refused to be entered by Strouse would have shown that DiCarlo’s forensic practice—all of them as previously noted—was improper and violated N.J.A.C. 13:49 and the State Medical Examiner Act 52:B17-68 et al, and were designed to provide benefit to Sauter et al, by not having Sauter investigated for Mrs. Sauter’s suspicious death.  He was successful. 

Lines 5-24: Nowhere does Mr. Strouse’s complaint allege that an investigation was conducted starting on January 19, 2006.  The Court is again in error when it states that DiCarlo’s final report declares, on January 19, 2006, that “Mrs. Sauter’s cause of death to be cancer.”  First, DiCarlo’s “Final Report” is dated January 27, 2006 (attachment 8).  This is also the date that DiCarlo falsified Mrs. Sauter’s Certificate of Death (attachments 17, 21,22, and 33), as verified in the public records.  Second, DiCarlo could not have legally declared Mrs. Sauter’s death to be from cancer because DiCarlo never conducted the mandatory suspicious death autopsy, as required by State law and proven earlier and contained in the evidence that Judge Lawson refused Strouse to present at the probable cause hearing.  Third, the analysis of the specimens taken from Mrs. Sauter during the DiCarlo-Certified External Examination on October 31, 2005, do not address cancer at all, just blood and urine analysis (attachment 19).  Indeed, DiCarlo knowingly and purposely chose not to request testing of the two specimens (liver and vitreous) that subsequently concluded that Mrs. Sauter was in a prolonged state of fasting or starvation condition and was dehydrated at the time of her death (attachment 20).  N.J.A.C. 13:49 and the State Medical Examiner Act 52-17B-86 et al, as discussed earlier, both require the Middlesex County Prosecutor to initiate the necessary suspicious death investigation, in coordination with the Sayreville Police Department and the County Medical Examiner (attachments 32, 25, 36, and 37).

According to DAG Denise Hollingsworth, based on her contacting the Prosecutors Office during the conduct of an administrative investigation (attachment 16), Kaplan and Lamb decided to wait until DiCarlo completed his investigation before concluding that they would not conduct their own investigation (attachments 15 and 38).  The incompetence of that decision meant that for a suspicious death reported on October 29, 2005, the crime scene was not secured through the date DiCarlo completed his investigation on January 27, 2006, over 80 days later.  The OAG, the Prosecutor, and now Judge Lawson would have anyone believe that there is no negligence and/or Official Misconduct on the part of Kaplan and Lamb.  The complaints filed against Kaplan and Lamb would shed considerable light on this subject, and clearly demonstrate criminal conduct, again to benefit Sauter and all the rest.

Both statutes cited earlier (N.J.A.C. and the Act) require the Prosecutors Office to conduct the necessary suspicious death investigation in coordination and cooperation with the Sayreville Police and the County Medical Examiner.  DiCarlo also notes in his External Examination Report (attachment 8) that the Middlesex County Prosecutors Office was directed to conduct the necessary suspicious death investigation.  The Court knows you cannot coordinate and cooperate if you are not investigating.  There is no prosecutorial discretion in a suspicious death investigation. 

Contrary to what Judge Lawson said in the probable cause hearing, the Prosecutor is not able to exercise discretion when the Medical Examiner directs him to conduct an investigation, as DiCarlo did.  Kaplan and Lamb knowingly and purposely chose not to investigate, abrogating duties and responsibilities inherent in their positions.  As such, the Middlesex County Prosecutors, Kaplan and Lamb, were not authorized to exercise discretion not to investigate and file charges against various public servants for their role in Mrs. Sauter’s suspicious death.

Lines 19-24: Incredibly, the Court—without completing its review—on this page (page 30 of 35 pages)  of the Opinion, concludes “…and based on the record before this Court and the finding of a lack of probable cause against all of the defendants,….”  The record before the Court is significantly incomplete, as intended by the Court.  The Court refused Strouse a fair and impartial probable hearing when it declared, without reference to a legitimate Rule of the Court, and contrary to what other Courts had proffered, the opportunity to present evidence in support of each one of his complaints.  Equally incredible is the fact that only one case was heard on January 11, 2011, a complaint against Raymond J. Sauter, for Murder 2C:11-3 (a) (1)(2).  That complaint alone took two hours.  And from that one case, the Court dismisses all 61 criminal complaints against all of the defendants.  Such conclusion by the Court is indeed a case of arbitrariness or abuse. This case was not heard at the probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011 and thus it cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 31:

            iv. Eric M. Aronowitz, First Deputy County Counsel, Middlesex County

            Lines 1-2:  The Court’s demeanor and attitude is quite disconcerting in this section of the Opinion.  One would have thought that in a probable cause hearing, the Court would merely receive evidence, seek clarification and explanation, be fair and impartial, and render an objective opinion.  This 35 page Opinion by Judge Lawson presents itself as if it was a trial,  requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, when in fact, the evidentiary requirements for a probable cause hearing are much less and more in line with what is considered the “reasonable person test.”  Judge Lawson sounds like the attorney representing the defendants, wherein he states:  “The charges of Perjury and False Swearing can be easily dismissed because Mr. Aronowitz was never under oath.” Can be easily dismissed?

The Court refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The six complaints against Aronowitz were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaint against Aronowtiz was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Aronowitz.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.  (attachment 37)

Lines 1-2:  The Court defends Aronowitz.  The Court acknowledges that Aronowitz would be guilty of Perjury and False Swearing if Aronowitz was under oath at the time.  Judge Lawson erroneously makes the statement that “Mr. Aronowitz was never under oath.”  Doesn’t the Court know the law?

According to Title 2C The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, 2C:28-1. Perjury:

a.  Offense defined.  A person is guilty of perjury, a crime of the third

degree, if in any official proceeding he makes a false statement

under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth

of a statement previously made, when the statement is material

and he does not believe it to be true.

 

            The State of New Jersey’s Criminal Charges to the Jury provides additional clarification regarding the meaning of certain words.

            Official proceeding is defined as follows:

            The term official proceeding is defined as “a proceeding heard or

which may be heard before any legislative, judicial, administrative

or other governmental agency or official authorized to take evidence,

under oath, including any referee, hearing examiner, commissioner,

notary or other .person taking testimony or deposition in connection

with any such proceeding.

 

Oath is defined as follows:

 

Under this element, any device employed to demonstrate the special

importance of the declaration, that is, the seriousness of the demand

for honesty, constitutes an oath or equivalent affirmation.

 

Thus, Aronowitz was under oath when he responded to the OSC for Judge Travis L. Francis (attachments 10, 13, and 23)), and according to Judge Lawson, as stated in his Opinion of January 20, 2011, there is a probable cause finding against Aronowitz for Perjury and False Swearing.

How the Court concluded that Aronowitz was not under oath at the time he made those written statements in response to an Order to Show Cause, and other motion responses, is anyone’s guess.  In fact, Aronowitz was under oath at the time he made the statements resulting in complaints of Perjury and False Swearing, among others.  At the time Aronowitz made the statements, he was responding to a motion before Judge Travis L. Francis, P.J.Ch., on behalf of Dr. DiCarlo and Middlesex County (attachments 13 and 10). 

This office represents the County of Middlesex, the Middlesex

County Medical Examiner’s Office and Dr. Frederick DiCarlo,

M.D.  I am in receipt of the Verified Complaint and Order to

show Cause With Temporary Restraints, which is returnable

before Your Honor, Wednesday, October 25, 2006 at 3:00 p.m.   AND

 

 

On behalf of the County of Middlesex, the Middlesex County

Medical Examiner and Dr. Frederick DiCarlo, M.D., we do not

opposed the relief sought and the entry of an Order consistent

therewith.  As such, unless Your Honor deems the presence

of this office necessary, we will not be appearing on the return

date of the Order to Show Cause.

 

This response to the Order to Show Cause places Mr. Aronowtiz under oath or equivalent affirmation, and thus the Court must conclude that Aronowitz did indeed Perjure himself and make False Swearings before the Court.  As such, Aronowitz’s statement:  “The fact is that the Sayreville Police Report did not report Ms. Sauter’s death as suspicious.” is a false statement, as was previously demonstrated (attachments 7 and 8).  Further, Aronowitz makes the following comment regarding toxicology testing: “Paragraph 24 of the Verified Complaint suggests that Dr. DiCarlo did not perform all tests that he might have.  Complete available toxicology testing was performed by Dr. DiCarlo.”  Two issues.  First, DiCarlo did none of the toxicology testing, the NJ State Toxicology Lab did all the testing.  Second, as has already been demonstrated by the Tox Lab Report, Dr. DiCarlo sent four specimens to the Tox Lab (attachment 19).  However, DiCarlo requested analysis of only two of the four specimens—blood and urine.  So Aronowitz lied when he stated that “Complete available toxicology testing was performed by Dr. DiCarlo.”  DiCarlo was aware of this false statement by Aronowitz and did nothing to correct it.  There has been no retraction. DiCarlo knowingly and purposely did not request analysis of the liver and vitreous, the two specimens that would have supported Strouse’s complaint, because he knew, as substantiated by independent forensic testing, that the results of the analysis of the liver and vitreous would confirm the starvation and dehydration accusation of murder against Sauter, which it did (attachment 20).

            Judge Lawson has clearly lost his objectivity in this matter and it appears as if he is not familiar with how a probable cause hearing should be conducted. It is unfortunately clear that Judge Lawson is defending Aronowitz, to wit, in defense of Aronowitz at lines 9-15 are almost laughable, if not sad:  “Mr. Aronowitz may have been trying to stat (sic) that such testing was conducted, not directly state which individual or lab performed the testing.”  As already proven by the State Lab Report, not all “such testing was conducted.” Where is the Court’s defense of Strouse’s statements? 

Judge Lawson’s actions are quite inappropriate for a probable cause hearing, even an illegal “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing.”  And Judge Lawson does not stop there.  Judge Lawson goes on to suggest that there were more than four specimens or samples taken from Mrs. Sauter, based on no evidence.  Opines Judge Lawson, “Furthermore, whether or not complete available toxicology testing was conducted hinges on whether he was referring to such testing on only the samples submitted for testing or on all samples taken.”  Here Judge Lawson suggests that more than four specimens/samples were taken.  Now why would Judge Lawson suggest something like that except in defense of DiCarlo?  According to the State Lab Report (attachment 19), only four specimens were taken, and DiCarlo requested that only blood and urine be analyzed.  Judge Lawson would have discovered that only four specimens/samples were taken during DiCarlo’s External Examination had he permitted Strouse to present the evidence in support of the criminal complaints.  The Court’s defense of defendants is certainly improper and denies Strouse a fair and impartial hearing. 

Lines 17-19: It is not a stretch at this point for a reasonable person to conclude that the Court is clearly defending Aronowitz, and as such is as guilty of misrepresentation of the probable cause hearing process as Aronowitz is guilty of all the complaints filed against him.  In fact, Judge Lawson may well be guilty of Official Misconduct.

Lines 20-24: Once again Judge Lawson brings into question his fairness in conducting this probable cause hearing.  Judge Lawson again defends Aronowtiz regarding the suspicious death report taken by Brennan and Sprague, reported to the Medical Examiner by Brennan and Sprague, and investigated by the Sayreville Police Department and the Medical Examiners Office.  Aronowitz makes the statement, “The fact is that the Sayreville Police Report did not report Ms. Sauter’s death as suspicious.”  (attachment 13) It is clear that Sprague, on October 29, 2005, refers to the crime/incident as “HOSPICE DEATH/SUSPICIOUS DEATH” and writes in his report, “On 10-29-05, this officer was contacted while off duty by Sgt. Donnamaria, who advised me that they needed a detective to respond to work in reference to a suspicious hospice death.” (attachment 7)  As late as 12-22-05, Det Amy Noble is investigating a HOSPICE DEATH/SUSPICIOUS DEATH (attachment 27), as recorded in her Supplemental Investigation Report.  Further, DiCarlo acknowledges in his External Examination Report (attachment 8) that possible foul play was reported by Mrs. Sauter’s brother (Strouse) and the Sayreville Police and the Prosecutors Offices had to conduct the necessary suspicious death investigations.  Note that the investigation would not have been initiated to begin with had this been a “normal” hospice death, as first reported.  Mrs. Sauter’s body was transported to the Funeral Parlor for next day cremation.  There was no need for an investigation.  An investigation is only conducted under certain circumstances, which, in this case, was a suspicious death.  Addressing the Courts concern regarding Aronowitz’s intent of meaning, the various reports speak for themselves.  For example, the Sayreville Police Supplemental Investigation Reports all indicate they are investigating a suspicious death; they offer no answers and no conclusion at the end of their investigation.  Likewise, the Medical Examiner’s External Examination offers no stated conclusion regarding a determination of a suspicious death, except for the fact that they were investigating a reported suspicious death.  The Medical Examiner, as we saw, had much to hide (attachment 32), and the Sayreville Police Department, based on their investigation, had much to cover up (attachment 35).  Had the Court permitted Strouse to present his evidence, both circumstantial and direct, the Court would have learned such.  To reiterate, neither the Supplemental Investigation Reports completed by the Sayreville Police nor the External Examination Report completed by the Medical Examiners Office (Dr. DiCarlo) made a definitive statement that Mrs. Sauter’s death was not suspicious.  By all counts, all of the evidence available to the Court, but not entered into the record, confirms that Mrs. Sauter’s death was suspicious, and that she was in a prolonged fasting or starvation condition and was dehydrated at the time of her death.  Had the Sayreville Police, the Medical Examiner, and the Middlesex County Prosecutors Office conducted an investigation of Mr.  Sauter, that answer could have been provided beyond a reasonable doubt.

 

Page 32:

Lines 3-4:  While the Court comments that “The Court will not parse words to find a misrepresentation.”, it is clear that it is the intent of the Court to find fault with most everything Strouse reports and to defend the defendants every step of the way, thus preventing Strouse from receiving a fair and impartial probable cause hearing(attachment 4).  It is also clear that a suspicious death was investigated (short of investigating Sauter) by the Sayreville Police and the Medical Examiners Office (attachments 7, 8, 12, 32, 35, and 36).

Lines 5-12: The Court again defends both DiCarlo and Aronowitz.  Public records available to but refused by the Court clearly demonstrate that Dr. DiCarlo did not conduct an autopsy as mandated and defined by N.J.A.C. 13:49, and the Act(attachment 21).  DiCarlo only took specimens from Mrs. Sauter (attachments 8 and 19) and did not meet the autopsy standard or definition described in the law.  The Court is intent on steering any complaints away from criminal to other venues, such as civil or Ethics Board and or the Bar Association.  Is the Court offering legal advice to Strouse, by suggesting that those are the venues to best hear these complaints? 

The Court states, “Accordingly, the Court finds no instance of lies or misrepresentation made by Mr. Aronowitz, and even if there were such instances, the complaint would only be properly before the Ethics Board and the Bar Association rather than a criminal complaint.”  Not so.  As demonstrated by Strouse, the complaints lodged against Aronowitz are Criminal Complaints and all fall under 2C.  The complaints lodged against Aronowitz would not fall under the umbrella of an ethics board or the bar association until after Aronowitz’s conviction. So here the Court is once again defending the defendants. It is clear that this Court has crossed the line of professional conduct in reviewing these complaints. Since these complaints were not discussed at the probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011, they cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 32:

            vi. a.  Anne Milgram, Attorney General, State of New Jersey

            The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The two complaints against Milgram were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaint against Milgram was ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Milgram.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.  (attachment 38)

Lines 16-25:  The Court once again makes an erroneous broad generalization regarding the criminal complaints against Ms. Milgram.  The two complaints against Ms. Milgram include Official Misconduct 2C:30-2(a)(b) and Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution of Another 2C:29-3 (a)(3)(5).  The charges against Ms. Milgram do not just stem from her refusal to prosecute, rather, and equally important, they stem from her refusal to properly investigate. 

The Court’s demeanor and attitude regarding its comments about this defendant are of concern and show favoritism towards the defendant and bias and prejudice towards Strouse.  For example, Judge Lawson states, “These charges can be quickly dismissed because this Court finds a lack of probable cause to issue an arrest warrant or summons against any of the above-named public official defendants.” “Can be quickly dismissed”?  These charges stand alone.  While the complaints may be inter-related they are not inter-dependent.  The Court cannot dismiss all complaints based on the dismissal of one complaint.

The Court is intent on dismissing all charges if just one charge is dismissed.  The Court must do this because if the Court finds probable cause for one of the complaints, it is concerned that it will necessarily have to find probable cause for all or many of the complaints.  This is the reason the Court refused to permit Strouse to present his evidence.  Other Courts would have permitted Strouse to present his evidence in support of his complaints as that is what one of the purposes of a probable cause hearing is all about.  Without looking at any evidence, Judge Lawson dismisses all complaints against all defendants. Without looking at the evidence, how can Judge Lawson arbitrarily and capriciously dismiss all charges?  Milgram knowingly and purposely failed to provide the necessary oversight over Hollingsworth, which was inherent in Milgram’s duties and responsibilities.  Strouse and Ausley had written Milgram numerous times imploring her intervention, and she ignored them. Since these complaints were not discussed at the probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011, they cannot be dismissed.

Page 32:

            vi. b Denise M. Hollingsworth, Deputy Attorney General, OAG

            The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The five complaints against Hollingsworth were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaint against Hollingsworth were ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaint and evidence from Strouse on Hollingsworth.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof (attachment 38).

The Court once again makes an erroneous broad generalization regarding the criminal complaints against Ms. Hollingsworth.  The five complaints against Ms. Hollingsworth include Official Misconduct 2C:30-2(a)(b); Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution of Another 2C:29-3 (a)(3)(5); Conspiracy 2C:5-2 a(1)(2); Pattern of Official Misconduct 2C:30-7 (a); and, Obstructing the Administration of Law or Other Government Function 2C:29-1(a).  The charges against Ms. Hollingsworth do not just stem from her refusal to prosecute, rather, and equally important, her refusal to conduct a criminal investigation, among others, and her bogus conclusions based upon a biased and prejudiced administrative review.

For example, Strouse had a lengthy telephone conversation with Hollingsworth describing the falsification of Mrs. Sauter’s Certificate of Death (attachments 17, 21, 33, 38, and 22).  Hollingsworth had over 600 pages of evidence before her and Strouse went line by line showing her how DiCarlo falsified the records, falsely swore in Superior Court, provided false information to authorities, including Superior Court, hindered Sauter’s and others apprehension, and committed Official Misconduct and Pattern of Official Misconduct.  Despite seeing in black and white before her very eyes that DiCarlo (among others) was “guilty”, Hollingsworth’s letter of June 9, 2008 (attachment 16), cleared DiCarlo and all defendants, resulting in the five complaints filed against her.  Please review the complaints against Ms. Hollingsworth, and the evidence Strouse can provide.

The Court’s demeanor and attitude regarding its comments against this defendant are of concern and show favoritism towards the defendant and bias and prejudice towards Strouse.  For example, Judge Lawson states, “These charges can be quickly dismissed because this Court finds a lack of probable cause to issue an arrest warrant or summons against any of the above-named public official defendants.” “Can be quickly dismissed”?  These charges stand alone. To dismiss one is not a license to dismiss all.  While the complaints may be inter-related they are not inter-dependent.  The Court is misguided in this logic.  The Court is intent on dismissing all charges if just one charge is dismissed.  The Court must do this because if the Court finds probable cause for one of the complaints, it is concerned that it will necessarily have to find probable cause for all of the complaints.  This is the reason the Court refused to permit Strouse to present his evidence.  Other Courts would have permitted Strouse to present his evidence in support of his complaints as that is what one of the purposes of a probable cause hearing is all about.  Without looking at any evidence, Judge Lawson dismisses all complaints against all defendants. Without looking at the evidence, Judge Lawson has arbitrarily and capriciously dismissed all charges.  Since these complaints were not discussed at the probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011, they cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 33:

            B. Complaints Against Members of Mrs. Sauter’s Family

                        i.  Deby Bath and Candice Boehler-Marquette

            The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  The six complaints against Bath and the five complaints against Boehler-Marquette were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints against Bath and Boehler-Marquette were ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaints and evidence from Strouse on Bath and Boehler-Marquette.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.  (attachment 35)

Lines 3-15: Contrary to what the Court wants the reader to believe, it matters not what the basis for all the criminal complaints are against Bath or Boehler.  Each complaint stands on its own merits. Dismissing one complaint does not require the Court to dismiss all the complaints, as the Court implies.  While the complaints may be inter-related they are not inter-dependent. 

The complaints against Bath include the following: (1) Perjury 2C:28-1 ETC; (2) False Swearing 2C:28-2 ETC.; (3) False Swearing (Inconsistent Statements) 2C:28-2 ETC; (4) Obstructing the  Administration of Law or Other Government Function 2C:29-1 ETC; (5) Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution of Another 2C:29-3 ETC; (6) False Reports to Law Enforcement Authorities 2C:28-4 ETC. 

The complaints against Boehler-Marquette include (1) Perjury; (2) False Swearing; (3) False Swearing (Inconsistent Statements); (4) Obstructing the Administration of Law or Other Government Function; and (5) Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution of Another.

Once again the Court’s demeanor concerns Strouse and should concern the judiciary at all levels.  In a legitimate probable cause hearing the judge should objectively hear the information, seek clarification where necessary, and note the evidence.  This Court continues to improperly defend the defendants in analyzing the complaints and generating its opinions.  For example, the Court comments, “The Perjury, False Swearing and Inconsistent Statements charges are easy to dispose of because neither Ms. Bath nor Ms. Marquette was ever under oath.”  The Court states that these complaints  “…are easy to dispose of.”?  The Court’s bias and prejudice is quite evident and revealing.  It is the intent of Judge Lawson to dismiss all of the complaints regardless of their validity, and statements from the Court like these certainly support that conclusion.  It brings into question the ability of the Court to provide a fair and impartial hearing for Strouse.

Either the Court does not know the law or its bias and prejudice against Strouse is overwhelming, making it impossible for Strouse to receive a fair and impartial hearing. Regarding Perjury, the Court alleges that Bath was not under oath at the time she made her Miranda statement, or when she provided other answers to law enforcement in official interviews.  According to Title 2C The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, 2C:28-1. Perjury:

a.  Offense defined.  A person is guilty of perjury, a crime of the third

degree, if in any official proceeding he makes a false statement

under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth

of a statement previously made, when the statement is material

and he does not believe it to be true.

 

            The State of New Jersey’s Criminal Charges to the Jury provides additional clarification regarding the meaning of certain words.

            Official proceeding is defined as follows:

            The term official proceeding is defined as “a proceeding heard or

which may be heard before any legislative, judicial, administrative

or other governmental agency or official authorized to take evidence,

under oath, including any referee, hearing examiner, commissioner,

notary or other .person taking testimony or deposition in connection

with any such proceeding.

 

Oath is defined as follows:

 

Under this element, any device employed to demonstrate the special

importance of the declaration, that is, the seriousness of the demand

for honesty, constitutes an oath or equivalent affirmation.

 

In summary then, when Bath was Mirandized she was under oath or equivalent affirmation.  A Miranda statement was taken at the Sayreville Police Station by Sprague and Noble, two detectives authorized to take evidence.  Bath was aware of the charges of murder that Strouse made as early as October 30, 2005, and thus was cognizant of the seriousness of the demand for honesty.  Clearly there are no grounds for dismissal of these complaints.  Short of the Miranda statement, the same holds true for Boehler.

            Regarding the complaint against Bath and Boehler for False Swearing and Inconsistent Statements, Title 2C The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, 2C:28-2. False Swearing and Inconsistent Statements, the law states:

a. False swearing.  A person who makes a false statement under oath

or equivalent affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of such

a statement previously made, when he does not believe the statement

to be true is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

 

b. Perjury provisions are applicable.

 

c. Inconsistent Statements. Where the defendant made inconsistent

statements under oath or equivalent affirmation, both having

been made within the period of the statute of limitations, the

prosecution may proceed by setting forth the inconsistent

statements in a single count alleging in the alternative that one

or the other was false and not believed by the defendant.  In such

case it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove which

statement was false but only that one or the other was false and

not believed by the defendant to be true.

 

            In summary then, Bath was under oath or equivalent affirmation during her Miranda statement and, along with Boehler, each time she was interviewed by Sprague and Noble. Bath and Boehler lied during these interviews and the Miranda statement, making statements that contradicted previous statements made.  As such, Bath and Boehler also provided false information to law enforcement.  There is no doubt that they knowingly made the statements and that one of the statements was false.  Further, it is clear that at the time each made the statements they knew they were false (attachment 35).  The Court’s actions are arbitrary and capricious with the intent to benefit and protect Sauter and all other persons charged herein from investigation.  The Court continues the conspiracy.

            Lines 16-23: The Court states “Moreover, the charges against both Ms. Bath and Ms. Marquette for Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function and Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution are also unsupported by any facts.”  Strouse reminds the Court that the Court prohibited Strouse from presenting any facts at the probable cause hearing when Judge Lawson informed Strouse and Ausley that this was a “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing.” The Court states that “Obstruction requires physical resistance or some other illegal act.”  What other illegal act is required?

            Title 2C The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, 2C:29-1, Obstructing administration of law or other governmental function states:

            a. A person commits an offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs

or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function

or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully

performing an official function by means of flight, intimidation,

force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means

of any independently unlawful act.

 

As noted by the Court, “Obstruction requires … some other illegal act.”  The law, as stated, uses the terms “independently unlawful act.”  The other unlawful or illegal acts are those proved above, including Perjury and False Swearing and False Swearing Inconsistent Statements.  These rise to the level of unlawful or illegal acts as they are criminal violations.  Evidence in support of these illegal acts was prohibited by the Court from being entered into the discussion on January 11, 2011.  The unlawful or illegal acts were committed to benefit and protect Sauter, DiCarlo, and all the other persons charged in these complaints.  The acts perverted the administration of law, and prevented public servants from lawfully performing an official functions i.e., murder investigation. 

The Court further states in defense of the defendants, “All that is alleged is that Ms. Bath and Ms. Marquette lied to the police about Mr. Sauter’s history of abuse.  These alleged lies, even if true, do not rise to the level of Obstruction.”  See also attachments 35 and 28. Recall that the Court refused to permit Strouse to present evidence at the probable cause hearing.  There is considerably more evidence than lying to the police about Mr. Sauter’s history of abuse (attachment 29).  False statements made by Bath and Boehler include awareness of acts by Sauter that were harmful to Mrs. Sauter; include first hand knowledge of Mrs. Sauter being starved; first hand knowledge of Mrs. Sauter not receiving adequate hydration; first hand knowledge of Mrs. Sauter being over-medicated to the point Mrs. Sauter was hallucinating and did not know the day, date, year, who she was, where she was, and who anyone else was, as a direct result of Sauter’s care.  Based on the law, these actions clearly rise to the level of obstruction.  Obstruction is a criminal offense.

            Regarding Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution 2C:29-3, Title 2C The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice provides the following, only one of which needs to be proven:

            a.  A person commits an offense if, with purpose to hinder

the detention, apprehension, investigation, prosecution,

conviction or punishment of another for an offense or

violation of Title 39 of the Revised Statutes or a violation

of chapter 33A of Title 17 of the Revised Statutes he:

           

(2) Provides or aids in providing a weapon, money transportation,

disguise or other means of avoiding discovery or apprehension

or effecting escape;

 

OR

           

 (3) Suppresses, by way of concealment or destruction, any evidence

of the crime, or tampers with a witness, informant, document or

other source of information, regardless of its admissibility in

evidence, which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of

such person or in the loading of a charge against him;

 

OR

           

 (5) Prevents or obstructs, by means of force, intimidation or deception,

anyone from performing an act which might aid in the discovery or

apprehension of such person or in the lodging of a charge against him;

 

OR

           

            (7) Gives false information to a law enforcement officer . . . .

           

            Clearly both Bath and Boehler-Marquette knew that Sauter had been or was likely to be charged with murder (attachments 26, 27,  28, and 35).  For example, they were both served in Ausley’s efforts to obtain Mrs. Sauter’s specimens, and in those papers, it was clear Sauter was alleged to have murdered Mrs. Sauter (Boehler-Marquette went into hiding and a private detective had to be hired to find and serve her).  By False Swearing and Inconsistent Statements, both acted with purpose to hinder the detention, apprehension, investigation, prosecution, or conviction of Raymond J. Sauter.  Likewise, both provided information to the Sayreville Police Department that was false, as charged in False Swearing Inconsistent Statements, specifically the contents of the August 2, 2005, email (attachments 29 and 35) from Boehler-Marquette to Ausley, in which Boehler states that Bath was aware of the abuse at the time it was happening.  These false and inconsistent statements misled the police and had the effect of discrediting both Ausley and Strouse; neither Detective Sprague nor Detective Noble ever corroborated any of Bath’s or Boehler’s accusatory statements against Ausley or Strouse and neither contacted Boehler’s therapist to confirm her admission of being in therapy for years, for abusive treatment from Sauter. No one ever retracted anything previously said.

By these actions, and others contained in the evidence that the Court refused Strouse to present, Bath and Boehler deceived Sprague and Noble, among others, from performing acts which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of Sauter (or others), or in the lodging of a charge against Sauter (or others).  Finally, both Bath and Boehler-Marquette gave false information to a law enforcement officer, as previously described; a law enforcement officer is defined as a person whose public duties include the power to act as an officer for the detection, apprehension, arrest and conviction of offenders against the laws of the State (N.J.S.A. 2C25-19c)  It was Bath’s and Boehler’s knowing and purposeful objective and intent to provide benefit to Sauter and protect him from investigation.  They succeeded, as Sauter has yet to be investigated for Mrs. Sauter’s suspicious death.

 

Page 34:

            Lines 1-6:  The Hindering complaint is laid out in detail in the preceding pages.  The Court comments:  “On the Hindering charge, there is no evidence that Mr. Sauter abused either Ms. Bath or Ms. Marquette except for the allegation by Mr. Strouse of an email by Ms. Marquette months before her mother’s death.  Accordingly there is no probable cause that Ms. Bath or Ms Marquette ever made false statements.” (attachment 29).  The Court is misinformed.  To perfect the Hindering complaint one need not prove “abuse” or physical action, as is stated by Judge Lawson.  As noted in the previous pages, Hindering may involve (2) aiding someone by other means to avoid discovery or apprehension; OR (3) Suppressing any evidence of a crime which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person or in the lodging of a charge against him; OR (5) Preventing or obstructing by means of deception anyone from performing an act which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person or in the lodging of a charge against him; OR (7) Gives false information to a law enforcement officer…. Any one of those are sufficient to conclude Hindering took place.  Accordingly, there is every reason to believe that  probable cause exists. Since complaints against Bath and Boehler-Marquette were not discussed at the probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011, these complaints cannot be dismissed.

 

Page 34:

            Raymond J. Sauter

            The Courts refused to provide Strouse a copy of the Summons Nos. so Strouse is unable to confirm or deny the Summons Nos. as they relate to the criminal Complaint.  Eleven of the 12 complaints against Sauter were not discussed on January 11, 2011, at the probable cause hearing.  The only complaint against Sauter discussed, as best Strouse and Ausley understand, was murder (2C:11-3) As a result, valuable evidence that would have supported Strouse’s criminal complaints against Sauter were ignored by the Court.  The criminal complaints as submitted by Strouse speak for themselves, noting that the prior Courts indicated that Strouse would be able to present his evidence at the Probable Cause Hearing.  Strouse looks forward to being able to have a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in the near future.  See the complaints and evidence from Strouse on Sauter.  The evidence can be provided to the Court in advance of the probable cause hearing if necessary.  The Court’s comments are a partial summary of Strouse’s complaint and in no way reflect the total sum of his accusation or the evidence in support thereof.

Lines 8-23: The Court  begins with “Mr. Strouse has only presented sufficient evidence to allow the Court to find that Mr. Sauter did not follow Mr. Strouse’s or Ms. Ausley’s care recommendation for Mrs. Sauter.”  Strouse would remind the reader that the Court prohibited Strouse from presenting any evidence at the probable cause hearing, denying him a fair and impartial hearing. 

In refusing to permit Strouse to present any evidence, the Court stated that (1) this was not an evidentiary probable cause hearing, and (2) that despite the Rules Strouse was following from filing in Middlesex County regarding not/not attaching the evidence to each complaint, the Monmouth Vicinage required all the evidence to be attached to each complaint.  Judge Lawson would not recognize that Strouse was simply following the rules and as a result of change of venue from Middlesex to Monmouth County (not a choice made by Strouse) there was no way that Strouse could comply with the Monmouth Vicinage requirements.  Strouse was dead in the water.  Ausley and Strouse made frequent references to the evidence but Judge Lawson refused to permit them to use it.  Ausley requested, at the end of the two-hour hearing of one complaint against Sauter, to leave the boxes of evidence for the Court’s use, review, and analysis.  Judge Lawson refused to accept the evidence.  As a result, Strouse did not receive a fair and impartial hearing, as he was caught in the middle between conflicting rules from two counties.

Regarding Mrs. Sauter’s end of life health care directive (attachment 9), written in 2000, the Court alleges that Strouse “has not offered any evidence to show that Mr. Sauter violated the directive by taking steps to end her life.”  First the Court refused to permit Strouse to present the a copy of the directive that provided the specific instructions and wishes of Mrs. Sauter.  Second, the Court refused to permit Strouse to present any evidence that would have shown that Sauter violated the directive.  Statements made by Strouse on this subject were rejected by the Court.  For example, Strouse  testified before Judge Lawson that Sauter made the following statement:  “The plan for Joyce is to die.”  Strouse also stated  that when Strouse (and Ausley) saw Joyce in September and October 2005, she looked as if she was living in a concentration camp, nothing but skin and bones, dying.  They also told Sauter that there existed special diets for patients in Mrs. Sauter’s condition and wondered where her diet or pain management medication plans were they she would have received at the time of discharge from the hospital.  While some persons may experience weight loss as a result of their cancer, not all do. 

The Court, without any evidence, generalizes the reason for Mrs. Sauter’s weight loss, simply saying it is normal.  Such conclusion completely discounts Strouse’s statements at the probable cause hearing, in essence calling him a liar.  The Court rejects the information presented by Strouse regarding the report from Dr. Berkland, the forensic Pathologist who analyzed the test results of Mrs. Sauter’s specimens (attachment 20), which indicated that Mrs. Sauter was in a prolonged fasting and starvation condition and was dehydrated at the time of her death.

By his own conduct, Sauter knowingly and purposely took actions that resulted in Mrs. Sauter’s death.  As Strouse reported to the Court on January 11, 2011, they specifically told Sauter that failure to feed Mrs. Sauter food would cause her to starve to death and that failure to give her liquids would dehydrate her to death.  Sauter, being a former police officer, knew this as well.  Despite offering all kinds of help, financially as well as inpatient care at a cancer treatment center (at no cost to Sauter), Sauter refused all help, at one point telling Strouse that he (Strouse) was not a doctor and to mind his own business.  By his own conduct, Sauter was starving Mrs. Sauter, dehydrating her, was told it was killing her, and continued to not feed or hydrate her.  Sauter knew that his actions would cause Mrs. Sauter’s death, and that was his plan.  Sauter was successful.

The Court is in error when it implies that the only evidence offered to the Court was the fact that “Sauter did not follow Mr. Strouse’s or Ms. Ausley’s care recommendation for Mrs. Sauter.”  These were not only the recommendations of Strouse and Ausley, but also the recommendations from the National Cancer Institute and the American Cancer Society, as well.  The were also clearly stated in Mrs. Sauter’s end of life directive.  Surely, Strouse stated, when Mrs. Sauter was discharged from the hospital  for her cancer treatment, Sauter would have followed the hospitals discharge instructions for diet and hydration; apparently not.  Sauter also made the point, said Strouse, that he was successful in the past at increasing Mrs. Sauter’s weight from 91 pounds to 112 pounds (attachment 11).  So Sauter knew what to do to keep Mrs. Sauter’s weight and hydration in check, and knowingly and purposely failed to do so, as was his intent..  The steps Sauter took, as Strouse explained at the hearing, included not following the proper diets or hydration procedures provided by her doctors or obtained by local nutritionists or dietitians., and; not following the pain medication management plan provided by Mrs. Sauter’s doctors.  In January of 2005, Mrs. Sauter was given 8 months to live, according to Deby Bath her daughter. 

For some reason, the Court accepts statements made by Strouse regarding Mrs. Sauter’s doctor’s certification of the amount of time she has to live.  Could it be that such statement supports the Courts intent of supporting Sauter?  Why would the Court accept this statement by Strouse as true and not others?  On September 29, 2005, in order to enter Hospice Care, Mrs. Sauter’s doctor certified that she had “6 months or less if the illness runs its course.”  This is the standard certification.  Mrs. Sauter had already outlived the eight months initially given.  Thus there was every reason to believe that if provided adequate food and hydration under a proper pain medication management program, Mrs. Sauter could conceivably live at least the six months mentioned by Dr. Lahaf in Dr. DiCarlo’s External Examination Report (attachment 8). 

The Court states that “Based upon the lack of evidence of any wrongdoing on the part of Mr. Sauter, other than his refusal to effectuate the care recommendations made by Mr. Strouse and Ms. Ausley, the Court finds no probable cause to support the charges of Murder or Neglect of Elderly or Disabled Persons.[7]  As best Strouse and Ausley can figure, Murder was the only charge heard at the probable cause hearing.  As Ausley and Strouse told the Court, the care they were seeking for Mrs. Strouse, their sister, was the standard level of care available for anyone in Mrs. Sauter’s condition; it is the care that a reasonable person would provide for someone in Mrs. Sauter’s condition.  It was also the standard of care that Mrs. Sauter requested and expected to be provided to her, in her end of life agreement (attachment 9), which Mr. Sauter concurred with, and which he knowingly and purposely chose not to follow.  Regarding the Murder charge, the Court again seems to not understand what is necessary to prove.  For example, Title 2C The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, 2C:11-3 Murder, provides the following:

Except as provided in N.J.S. 2C:11-4, criminal homicide constitutes murder when:

(1) The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death;

OR

(2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death;

 

            Since the Court spent almost the entire two hours of the hearing on the Murder charge against Raymond J. Sauter, and no other complaints, it is worth taking a closer look at the information available.

MURDER

(N.J.S.A. 2C:11?3a(l) and 3a(2))

 

            A citizen’s complaint is filed against Raymond J. Sauter for the murder of Joyce B. (Strouse) Sauter.

 

            A person is guilty of murder if he:

                        (1)        caused the victim’s death or serious bodily injury that then resulted in the victim’s death; and

                        (2)        the defendant did so purposely or knowingly.

            Each of the following elements will be proven beyond a reasonable doubt:

                        (1)        that Raymond J. Sauter caused Joyce B. (Strouse) Sauter’s

 death or serious bodily injury that then resulted in Joyce B. (Strouse) Sauter.

 death, and

                        (2)        that the defendant did so purposely or knowingly.

            One element that must proven beyond a reasonable doubt is that Sauter acted purposely or knowingly.

            A person acts purposely when it is the person’s conscious object to cause death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.

            A person acts knowingly when the person is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.

            The nature of the purpose or knowledge with which Sauter acted toward Joyce B. (Strouse) Sauter is a question of fact to be decided by a jury. Purpose and knowledge are conditions of the mind which cannot be seen and can only be determined by inferences from conduct, words or acts. It is not necessary to produce a witness or witnesses who could testify that Sauter stated, for example, that Raymond J. Sauter’s purpose was to cause death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or that Raymond J. Sauter knew that his conduct would cause death or serious bodily injury resulting in death. It is within the Jury’s power to find that proof of purpose or knowledge has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inferences which may arise from the nature of the acts and the surrounding circumstances. Such things as the place where the acts occurred, warnings given to Sauter regarding feeding and hydration, offers of help for treatment, feeding, and hydration made by family and friends, the requirements authorized by Joyce in her end of life document, the physical condition of Joyce at the time of her death, and all that was done or said by Sauter preceding, connected with, and immediately succeeding the events leading to the death of Joyce B. (Strouse) Sauter are among the circumstances to be considered.

            Although it must be proven that the Sauter  acted either purposely or knowingly, it is not required to prove a motive.  If the essential elements of the offense are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court must accept that probable cause exists and that Sauter must be charged with the offense regardless of his motive or lack of a motive. 

            A homicide or a killing by starvation, dehydration, overmedication, or suffocation, such as withholding nutrients or food, withholding liquids, overmedication to the point of disorientation and hallucination, in itself would permit a reasonable person to draw an inference that Sauter’s purpose was to take the life or cause serious bodily injury resulting in death.  The withholding of food and liquids is known to be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The Jury should consider the lack of food and hydration, along with overmedication, and Sauter’s stated plan for Joyce to die, and the manner and circumstances of her killing.  The Jury should be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Raymond J. Sauter failed to follow hospital discharge instructions to properly feed, properly hydrate, and properly medicate Mrs. Sauter, resulting in her death, and from the manner and circumstances of the killing, as to Sauter’s purpose or knowledge.

            The other element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt is that Sauter caused Mrs. Sauter’s death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.

            In order to convict Sauter of murder, it must also be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant either purposely or knowingly caused the victim’s death or serious bodily injury resulting in death. In that regard, “serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death. A substantial risk of death exists where it is highly probable that the injury will result in death.

            To find Sauter guilty of purposeful serious bodily injury murder, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that it was Sauter’s conscious object to cause serious bodily injury that then resulted in the Joyce’s death; that Sauter knew that the injury created a substantial risk of death; and that it was highly probable that death would result. To find Sauter guilty of knowing serious bodily injury murder, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Sauter was aware that it was practically certain that his conduct would cause serious bodily injury that then resulted in Joyce’s death; that Sauter knew that the injury created a substantial risk of death; and that it was highly probable that death would result. As Ausley and Strouse have already stated, they specifically told Sauter if he did not feed Mrs. Sauter, she would die from starvation, and; that if Sauter did not give Mrs. Sauter liquids, she would die from dehydration.  Sauter proceeded to not feed or hydrate Mrs. Sauter sufficiently to keep her alive.  As noted in the forensic report prepared by Dr. Michael O. Berkland, DO, Mrs. Sauter was in a prolonged fasting and starvation condition and was dehydrated at the time of her death. Both Bath and Sauter acknowledge that they only fed Mrs. Sauter from an “eyedropper” on occasion.  Both Bath and Sauter acknowledge that they purposely kept Mrs. Sauter overmedicated because they thought she was in pain—though they never asked her, and could not ask her, because she was medicated to the point of being non-responsive, as testified to by Strouse.

 

 

Page 35:

            Lines 1-12:  The Court again has confused criminal complaints made by Strouse with someone else. This again brings into question the Courts ability to accurately and effectively review, analyze, and make decisions regarding probable cause.  If the Court cannot review the correct charges, how can the Court reach the correct conclusions and decision and opinions?  For example, the Court states that Strouse charged Sauter with (1) Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution and (2) Falsifying or Tampering With Records.  These statements by the Court are grossly inaccurate. Strouse did not charge Sauter with (2) Falsifying or Tampering With Records.  Strouse charged Sauter with Hindering One’s Own Apprehension or Prosecution 2C:29-3.b(1)(2)(3), among others.  Regarding Conspiracy 2C:5-2 (a) ETC., there are four separate complaints. Since none of these complaints were discussed at the probable cause hearing on January 11, 2011, it is not possible for the Court to dismiss any of them by a finding of no probable cause.

            The Court comments, “As for the destruction of evidence, Dr. DiCarlo legally turned Mrs. Sauter’s body over to Mr. Sauter, who followed Mrs. Sauter’s wishes in having her body cremated.”  Mrs. Sauter’s wishes do not trump the State Medical Examiner Law requirements that next of kin do not receive the body of the deceased until the medical examiner completes his investigation.  Since Dr. DiCarlo did not complete his investigation until January 27, 2006, Mrs. Sauter’s body should not have been released until that time, no less to the person alleged to have murdered her N.J.A.C. 13:49-5.1 (c).  Dr. DiCarlo’s release of Mrs. Sauter’s body to the person alleged to have murdered her was in violation of State law and was an illegal act.  Since Strouse was not permitted to present his evidence in support of his charge of Murder against Raymond J. Sauter, the complaint should not be dismissed.  Additionally, since none of the other complaints against Sauter were discussed at the probably cause hearing they cannot be dismissed, either.

 

III.       CONCLUSION

            Page 35:

Lines 13-16:  The Court states that it finds no probable cause to issue summons or

arrest warrants pursuant to R. 3:3-2, against any of the defendants named herein. According to Rules of the Court, R. 3:3-2 was deleted July 13, 1994, to be effective January 1, 1995 and is noted as (Reserved). It appears the Court cites a non-existent rule upon which to find no probable cause (attachment 39).  In fact, Rule 3:3-2, deleted as noted, addressed “Form and Contents of Warrant and Summons”, and has nothing to do with probable cause hearings. 

 

III.       CONCLUSION

1)      Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, the Court cannot dismiss any of the 61 Criminal Complaints filed against twelve public servants and three others. 

2)      The Court must entertain a fair and impartial probable cause hearing in which Strouse is permitted to present all of his evidence. 

3)      The Court must also arrange for the signing of the four complaints yet to be assigned Summon Nos., as noted by the Sayreville Municipal Court (Ms. Lesinski) on June 2, 2010. 

4)      Judge Lawson finds no probable cause to issue summons or arrest warrants to any of  the 15 persons named, pursuant to R. 3:3-2.  According to Rules of the Court, R. 3:3-2 was deleted July 13, 1994 to be effective January 1, 1995 and is noted as (Reserved).  The Court cites a non-existent rule upon which to find no probable cause (attachment 38).

5)      Judge Lawson’s professional conduct in conducting this “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing” should be closely reviewed.

 

 

 

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

1.  Judge Lawson Letter of January 20, 2011

2.  Middlesex County Superior Court Naming the Case State v. Sauter et al

3.  Judge Lawson Letter of January 6, 2011 (state of NJ v. Strouse)

4.  Read the Court Transcript or listen to the 2-disk CD

5.  Sauter Complaints Pending Assignment of Summons Nos.

6.  Judge Lawson Letter of January 6, 2011

7.  Sayreville Police Supplemental Investigation Report dated 10/29/2005 and 12/22/2005

8.  External Examination Report

9.  Mrs. Sauter’s End of Life Directive

10. Judge Travis L. Francis Opinion (see ref 23 corrected)

11. SPD[8] Supplemental Investigation Report dated 10-30-2005

12. SPD Incident Report dated 10-29-2005

13. Aronowitz Motion Response to the Court September 29, 2006

14. N.J.A.C. Title 13, Chapter 49, and; State Medical Examiner Act 52:17B-86 et al

15. Kaplan and Lamb Letters

16. Hollingsworth Letter of June 9, 2008

17. Mrs. Sauter’s Certificate of Death Amended January 27, 2006

18. Definition of proper forensic practice 52:17B-86

19. NJ State Toxicology Lab Report

20. Michael Berkland, DO, Letter

21. Mrs. Sauter Certificate of Death Dated 10/31/2005

22. Dr. DiCarlo Letter of 12/27/2007

23. Judge S.L. Reisner Opinion (see ref. 10 corrected)

24. INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

25. Cremation Date and Time

26. SPD Supplemental Investigation Report Dated 12/22/2005

27. SPD Supplemental Investigation Report Dated 12/27/2005

28. SPD Bath Miranda Statement Dated 12/27/2005

29. Candice Boehler-Marquette Email of August 2, 2005

30. Ausley Attempt to Correct Mrs. Sauter’s Certificate of Death

31. Dr. Falzon’s Response To Ausley’s Attempt to Correct Mrs. Sauter’s Cert. Of Death

32. DiCarlo Summary

33. Jack Venturi Letter of January 6, 2005

34. INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

35. SPD Summary

36. Prosecutor Summary

37. Aronowitz Summary

38. Hollingsworth Summary

39. NJ Law Network, Rules of the Court, R. 3:3-2

40.  Chief Justice Stuart Rabner’s ORDER

 

 

 

 

Criminal Division/Probable Cause Response to Lawson  02-05-11. whs

[1] Liability for Another’s Conduct 2C2-6 a. b (2(3)(4) c (1)(a)(b)(c) and f.

[2] “Proper Forensic Practice” consists of those procedures which are required to perform the mandated role of medical examiner, which is to determine the cause and manner of death within a reasonable degree of medical probability; to identify and analyze evidence in criminal matters; to preserve organs for transplant and to otherwise preserve the public health.

[3] This Complaint is the Complaint that the Court has yet to assign a Summons No. to and has been pending assignment of a summons number since June 2, 2011, per Ms. Lesinski of the Sayreville Municipal Court.

[4] See Criminal Jury Charges 2C:11-3.  In part,  “Although the State must prove that the defendant acted either purposely or knowingly, the State is not required to prove motive.”

[5] Judge Glenn Grant; Judge Edward Herman; Judge George Boyd; Judge DeVesa; Judge Lawrence Lawson

[6] The Rules of the Court do not address a “non-evidentiary probable cause hearing”.

[7] Complaints against Sauter include (1) Murder; (2) Abandonment, Neglect of Elderly Person, Disabled Adult; (3) Hindering One’s Own Apprehension or Prosecution; (4) Conspiracy (five separate complaints), and; (5) Liability for Another’s Conduct (four separate complaints).

[8] Sayreville Police Department


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